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JASON V. ALTILIO 
 
Adviser: Professor Bernard Baumrin 
 
 Close interpersonal relationships are a part of everyone’s life at some point.  For most people 
these relationships are actually prominent parts of their everyday lives.  As such, it is important to 
figure out whether and how they fit into different normative theories of ethics.  Relationships like 
those that exist as romantic couples, close friendships, and parent-child relationships share certain 
features with other close interpersonal relationships that I define as “intimate relationships” in this 
dissertation.  Intimate relationships are those that exist between people when they wish one another 
well, act for one another, do so mutually, treat one another as ends in themselves, and trust one 
another.  If a normative theory is to account for moral value in intimate relationships then it must 
meet a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  My purpose in this dissertation is to synthesize 
these conditions after analyzing four distinct normative theories’ accounts of moral value in intimate 
relationships: Kantianism, G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and Virginia 
Held’s ethics of care.  These four theorists’ approaches to normative ethics were selected because 
each theorist claims to value intimate relationships yet each provides a different account of that 
value.  I first show that each theorist considers intimate relationships to be morally valuable and then 
analyze their theories’ abilities to account for that value using four value terms: intrinsic good, 
extrinsic good, instrumental good, and final good.  I then identify the components of each normative 
theory that either allow it to capture or prevent it from capturing the moral value of intimate 
relationships.  This leads to the conclusion that a normative theory must allow for value in each of 
the components of an intimate relationship and appraise the relationships themselves to be more than 
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instrumentally valuable in order to account for any moral value in the relationships.  Those people 
who treat the intimate relationships in their lives as having moral value will be able to gauge the 






In the dissertation that follows I refrain from arguing for a conclusion that many, myself 
included, already believe and treat as being true: that intimate relationships, or close 
interpersonal relationships, have moral value.  I instead show that several philosophers also treat 
this claim as being true before I synthesize a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a 
normative theory must meet in order to account for such moral value. 
I owe the strength of my conviction in this belief and my interest in the topic of intimate 
relationships to many of the same people to whom I owe thanks for helping me on my way to 
completing this dissertation.  It is my pleasure to be able to thank at least some of those people 
here, and being a dissertation on interpersonal relationships there are a lot of people to thank. 
For his constant support, encouragement, guidance, probing questions, historical 
perspective, and general wisdom I thank my advisor Stefan Bernard Baumrin.  I took Ethics with 
him my first semester in the program and asked him whether the idea I expressed in my final 
paper for the class could be the foundation for a dissertation.  That idea went through many 
changes before it became what follows; nevertheless, the “yes” I got that first semester set the 
stage for a relationship that I appreciate deeply. 
I also owe Virginia Held special thanks for all the help she has offered me on this 
dissertation and in understanding the ethics of care.  When I decided to audit her course on new 
developments in the ethics of care I made perhaps the best decision I made while in the program. 
That semester I began to see the ethics of care as more than just a critique but as a source of 
exciting positive advances in ethics.  I credit Virginia Held’s teaching during the course and her 
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willingness to correspond with me after the course was over for my ongoing epiphany in that 
regard. 
I would also like to thank several other members of the faculty without whom this 
dissertation would remain incomplete.  David Rosenthal was willing to step in and act as my 
third committee member on short notice and helped me pin down a precise defense date.  Sibyl 
Schwarzenbach’s and Peter Simpson’s readiness to serve as my two readers despite the fact that 
the spring semester had already ended is deeply appreciated.  Rosamond Rhodes also provided 
me with comments on early drafts of my dissertation which helped me focus and clarify many of 
my arguments.  
Among my fellow students in the philosophy program at CUNY I was fortunate enough 
to find many willing interlocutors and I would therefore like to thank in no particular order Lily 
Frank, Jordan Pascoe, Damien DuPont, Fritz McDonald, James Dow, Jonah Goldwater, Paul 
Cummins, Steven Birnbaum, Carl Hammer, Carl Brownson, Jessica Rutberg, Rachel Fedock, 
Ornaith O’Dowd, Katherine Mendis, Cressida Gaukroger, Jacob Berger, Rosemary Twomey, 
and Bana Bashour for filling my time at the Graduate Center with friendly conversation, 
encouragement, and philosophy outside the classroom.   
I consider myself especially privileged to have developed close interpersonal 
relationships with Leonard Finkelman, Amanda Favia, and Kamili Posey.  I am grateful to 
Leonard for a friendship born of Mets games and his weekly sojourns to Staten Island that has 
deepened to include topics ranging from our personal lives to philosophy to Star Wars despite an 
increase in the geographical distance between us.  I thank Amanda for all the fun and 
philosophical conversations we had on our commutes to and from events revolving around Mt. 
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Sinai, including our trip to Oxford.  Kamili, thank you for all the wonderful music 
recommendations, I do not think I will ever meet anyone with such similar taste and appreciation 
for music to my own.  I am also deeply appreciative of the nights Amanda, Kamili, and I spent 
cooking vegan food, talking philosophy, and watching movies.  It has been my pleasure to share 
our experiences of the program together with all three of you.  In addition to making me a better 
philosopher and a better philosophy professor, I am quite sure that my relationships with the 
three of you have the sort of value I defend in this dissertation. 
It was at Long Island University’s Brooklyn Campus that I was first exposed to and came 
to appreciate philosophy generally.  It was there too that the foundations of this dissertation were 
laid.  Thus, I am very grateful to Kristana Arp, Margaret Cuonzo, Joe Filonowics, and Melissa 
Grant for their role in my education.  Kristana was my first philosophy professor, led me through 
my first independent study on the philosophy of friendship, and was the philosopher I chose to 
talk to when I was trying to decide whether to give up a career in pharmacy in an attempt to 
become a professional philosopher.  Clearly, without her involvement my time at LIU would 
have been very different and I might well have never started this dissertation.  Margaret, in 
addition to suggesting I apply to the Graduate Center and hiring me to my first adjunct position 
as a philosophy professor, taught me as a student how far philosophy extends beyond the 
classroom walls.  Joe’s constant encouragement with my writing and continual effort in making 
the environment at LIU conducive to philosophical thought and community solidified my belief 
that I could succeed in philosophy after graduating from LIU.  Melissa Grant was the first to 
introduce me to the ethics of care in a course on theories of feminism that still sticks out in my 
mind as one of the most well taught classes I have ever had the privilege of taking. 
 
page ix 
I am also incredibly fortunate to have developed four close interpersonal relationships, 
long lasting friendships, with Shivang Shah, Jason Farbman, Steve Altman, and Jared DelRosso.  
I have known Shivang since Middle School and our relationship has deepened through the years 
as we have shared countless experiences that have impacted the directions of our lives and our 
thoughts on innumerable topics with one another.  Jay and I have sincerely discussed some of the 
most meaningful questions philosophy has to offer as well as the most personal details of our 
lives with one another.  Steve and I have cultivated a relationship of mutual care and concern out 
of our deep appreciation for baseball and the New York Mets.  Jared’s intellectual curiosity has 
consistently provided us with probing conversations that enlarge the boundaries of our own 
interests.  It is the four of you that originally rooted my interest in friendship at the outset of my 
commitment to philosophy and it is with the four of you, and our wives, that I have come the 
closest to having detailed conversations about the concrete meaning of this dissertation.  With 
intellects such as yours surrounding me since high school it is no wonder that I grew to love 
philosophical discussion, so I thank the four of you for providing me with the relationships I 
needed to see my work on this topic flourish. 
I owe my deepest gratitude to my family, for it is at home where I formed my first and 
most lasting intimate relationships.  My parents, Ronnie and Lisa Altilio, supported me when I 
decided to switch from the much more lucrative and secure career of pharmacist to the much 
more risky possibility of philosophy professor.  Thank you for your constant support and 
confidence in me.  My brother Michael Altilio was my first friend and there is no replacing the 
experiences we shared together as children.  I remember my maternal grandmother, Nellie 
Marion, and paternal grandfather, Victor Altilio, as shining lights of unconditional love and 
support that undoubtedly spurred my interest in interpersonal relationships.  My wife Michelle 
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Altilio, besides giving birth to and helping raise my three children, has supported me with her 
love and patience as I completed this dissertation.  Without that love and the smiling faces of 
Adam, Ryan, and Amelia Altilio to encourage me to finish writing, this dissertation would never 
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Intimate Relationships: Reality and Normativity: Introduction 
 Close interpersonal relationships are undeniably part of real human lives.  Everyone has 
parents, most people have at least one close friend, and many people have siblings, children, or 
other family members with whom they have close relationships.  Some of these relationships are 
ones people are born into and others are formed, but without question these relationships are 
significant to the people that create and foster them. 
 The constant presence of such relationships in real lives has given rise to many theories 
about relationships as well as the role they should play in human lives.  Questions about close 
interpersonal relationships have been addressed in works of philosophy and literature.  While 
Western thought owes a great debt to the authors of antiquity and the middle ages, I would like 
to focus on Giovanni Boccaccio’s Decameron as a work that tackled these issues and in doing so 
influenced, or at least prefigured, a great deal of subsequent thought and literature about intimate 
relationships.
1
  The stories of Decameron are especially interesting because they detail several 
different components of close interpersonal relationships that are of enduring importance. 
One noteworthy characteristic of the stories of Decameron is that they do not necessarily 
equate sex with love.  This is an important distinction for the purposes of this dissertation 
because the close interpersonal relationships that will be defined in chapter three as intimate may 
or may not include a sexual component: the love at the heart of these morally valuable 
relationships is not dependent on sex.  Many stories in Decameron detail relationships that 
involve sex without love and others which involve love without sex. 
                                                 
1
 For example, there is evidence that stories from Decameron inspired or at least bear a strong resemblance to stories 
in Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales and a couple of Shakespeare’s plays. McGrady, D. (1977). “Chaucer and 
Decameron Reconsidered.” The Chaucer Review, 1-26. and Wright, H. G. (1955). “How Did Shakespeare Come to 





 For example, the fifth story of the third day of Decameron describes the relationship 
between Ricciardo the Magnifico and the wife of Signoir Francesco.  Ricciardo is a young 
wealthy man without any court status that is so well mannered and dressed that he is called the 
Magnifico as a sign of respect.  Signoir Francesco is a Knight who is stingy despite possessing 
an abundance of riches and is married to a beautiful and virtuous woman.  Ricciardo has for a 
long time secretly courted Signoir Francesco’s wife without any success.  Word of Ricciardo’s 
interest in her eventually makes it to Signoir Francesco.  Someone suggests to Signoir Francesco 
that if he asks Ricciardo for his horse Ricciardo will give it to him for love of Signoir 
Francesco’s wife.  Though Signoir Francesco can afford to buy the horse he jumps at the 
opportunity to get such a splendid animal for free.  Under the pretense of buying the horse, 
Signoir Francesco invites Ricciardo to his home.  Ricciardo does, in fact, offer the horse to 
Signoir Francesco for free under the condition that Ricciardo can speak to his wife out of anyone 
else’s earshot.  Signoir Francesco agrees after privately telling his wife not to say anything in 
response to Ricciardo’s words.  Signoir Francesco’s wife is displeased with the request since she 
does not want to hear Ricciardo’s words or entreaties.  Nevertheless, she agrees to comply with 
her husband’s request.  Upon doing so and hearing Ricciardo’s words “she began to finde that in 
her, which (before) she never felt, namely Love.”
2
  Though she keeps her promise to her husband 
and does not offer any verbal response, the quick thinking Ricciardo sees the non-verbal cues of 
someone affected by his words and figures out Signoir Francesco’s plan.  Ricciardo then speaks 
as if speaking for Signoir Francesco’s wife and expresses the gratitude and sentiments that she 
could not verbalize.  Signoir Francesco receives his horse and leaves for Milan as his wife is left 
to contemplate Ricciardo’s words and suggestion for a subsequent meeting. 
                                                 
2
 Boccaccio, G. 1620. Decameron 3 Different Translations by John Florio, John Payne and J.M. Rigg in 1 eBook. 
Retrieved from http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-decameron-giovanni-




 This story makes the distinction between sex and love quite clear.  Though Signoir 
Francesco and his wife had certainly had sex before his wife’s conversation with Ricciardo, it 
was Ricciardo’s speech that first engendered feelings of love in Signoir Francesco’s wife.  
Furthermore, this love is felt by Signoir Francesco’s wife and by Ricciardo without them having 
had sex with one another.  Additionally, at the end of the story the reader is left in suspense 
about whether the two lovers ever physically consummated their love. 
 Boccaccio also included stories that explore familial love in Decameron.  This indicates 
that Boccaccio saw relationships marked by familial love as worthy of consideration alongside 
those relationships containing a romantic sense of love. 
 The eighth story of the second day provides one example of such familial love.  In this 
story the Count D’Angiers is appointed Governor of France while the King and his son are away 
at war.  In the course of fulfilling his obligations the Count catches the eye of the prince’s wife.  
However, when the honorable Count rejects her advances she accuses him of attempted rape.  
Knowing the danger he faces the Count quickly flees from France and arranges care for his 
daughter and son.  The Count himself begins a very tough life as serving man to an Earl in 
Ireland.  The Count’s daughter, Violenta, through several turns of good fortune marries the son 
of one of the King of England’s marshalls.  Lewes, the Count’s son, through similar good fortune 
marries into the position of another of the King of England’s marshalls situated in Wales.  
Eighteen years after the Count first fled France he leaves Ireland to search for his children.  He is 
overjoyed at his children’s circumstances and considers all the hardships he has endured in 
Ireland as nothing in light of his discovery.  Without revealing himself as Violenta’s father or his 
grandchildren’s grandfather, he is taken into Violenta’s house because of his grandchildren’s 




confesses her sin against the Count asking that he and his children be reinstated to their former 
honor if they still live.  After hearing an official proclamation to this effect, the Count finally 
reveals himself to his son and son-in-law.  The Count then has his son-in-law present him to the 
King of France to claim the reward promised in the proclamation as a retroactive dowry for his 
daughter’s hand in marriage.  Finally, the Count is also reunited with his daughter and the entire 
family is elated as the Count is reinstated to an even higher position in France than he held 
before he was forced to flee from the country. 
 The inclusion of this story among those of Decameron shows that the love shared 
between a father and his children is worthy of mention alongside the love shared between 
romantic couples.  The Count’s decision to remain anonymous even after finding out his 
children’s prestigious lots in life shows that he loves his children for their own sakes.  He gives 
up the opportunity to be released from his lowly position in life so as not to upset his daughter’s 
happiness.  Only after he knows that revealing himself will help his children does he do so.  
Additionally, his children’s response to seeing their father alive again shows the love they clearly 
feel toward him.  The number of stories detailing romantic love in Decameron may far outstrip 
those addressing familial love, however the stories that deal with familial love never feel out of 
place amongst the one hundred stories.  Though different, the two categories of love are both 
significant when describing love’s place in actual human lives. 
 Another reason that Boccaccio’s Decameron is important is that many of its stories stress 
the value of mutuality in close interpersonal relationships.  The stories as a whole emphasize the 
point that close interpersonal relationships cannot be unidirectional.  In the stories of Decameron 





 One particularly poignant example of mutuality’s necessity in close interpersonal 
relationships appears in the ninth story of the fifth day of Decameron.  In this story Frederigo 
falls in love with a Gentlewoman named Giana.  In an effort to curry Giana’s favor Frederigo 
spares no expense to lavish her with many expensive gifts and honors.  However, Giana has no 
feelings for Frederigo and is unmoved by his expenditures.  Nevertheless, Frederigo spends the 
majority of his fortune trying to garner the affection of Giana and is ultimately left with only a 
small farm, a couple of servants, and a treasured hunting falcon.  Frederigo’s love for Giana 
never falters and only increases, yet he is unable to continue his extravagant attempts to win her 
heart.  Eventually Giana’s husband dies and she moves to the country near where Frederigo’s 
small farm is located.  Her son enjoys hunting with trained dogs and falcons and comes to greatly 
desire Frederigo’s falcon, yet cannot bear to ask him for it since it is obvious that it is one of 
Frederigo’s only remaining valuable possessions.  Giana’s son suddenly falls very ill and tells his 
mother that if she can obtain Frederigo’s falcon he will surely recover.  Giana feels guilty asking 
Frederigo for the one possession that still gives him joy knowing that her inability to reciprocate 
the love Frederigo feels for her is in part responsible for Frederigo’s situation.  Nevertheless, her 
love for her son prompts her to visit Frederigo with the intention of asking for his falcon.  When 
she arrives Frederigo tells her that he considers all his losses insignificant in light of his feelings 
for her and that he will happily accept the honor of having her dine with him.  Unfortunately, 
Frederigo has no food worthy of Giana and decides to have his prized falcon cooked for her 
pleasure.  Giana and her attendant enjoy dinner without knowing they are eating the falcon she 
had come to request.  When she requests the falcon of Frederigo after dinner, Frederigo is 
devastated that he cannot grant her request.  Giana deeply appreciates Frederigo’s gesture, but is 




and further reflecting on Frederigo’s kindness Giana tells her brethren that she will only accept 
Frederigo as her second husband, despite their protests to the contrary.  The two are in fact 
married and “…they lived, and loved together in equal joy and happinesse.”
3
 
 This story shows the necessity of mutual feelings of love to the existence of close 
interpersonal relationships.  Frederigo loved Giana and ardently sought to prove his love to her 
and engender similar feelings in her.  In fact, he spent all his wealth in his efforts to win her 
heart.  Nevertheless, the relationship could not become a close one until Giana was able to 
reciprocate that love at the end of the story. 
 Trust is another part of close interpersonal relationships that the stories of Decameron 
stress.  Many of the problems that the characters in Decameron’s stories face are caused by a 
lack of trust.  Several stories go as far as showing how close interpersonal relationships break 
down without trust. 
 Perhaps the clearest example of this appears in the fifth story of the seventh day of 
Decameron.  A very rich merchant living in Arimino was married to a beautiful woman.  This 
merchant, however, was extremely jealous and because he thought her beauty would cause 
others to fall in love with her he kept her locked away in his home.  As the story states “many 
persons condemned to death, have en[j]oyed larger libertie in their imprisonment.”
4
  The 
merchant’s jealousy, though, was unfounded as his wife had not thought to love another.  
Eventually the wife, justifiably upset by her confinement and overall situation, decided to 
attempt a tryst as revenge for her poor treatment by her husband and as a reprieve from the 
boredom she experienced.  Despite her confinement she is able to contact a young Gentleman 
named Philippo.  Then, she tells her husband that she needs to confess her sins as the feast of 
                                                 
3
 Ibid.  pg 484. 
4




Christmas approaches.  He allows her to go, but specifies the particular church and Chaplain that 
she is to confess to and installs himself in the confessional.  Despite his preparations to the 
contrary, she recognizes her husband as the confessor.  She tells her husband of a fictitious friar 
who she sleeps with every night despite all the locked doors and her husband’s presence.  She 
then has her husband, disguised as a priest, promise not to tell her husband of her sins.  As her 
husband sets himself up with armor and weapons to meet the made up friar at the door, the wife 
invites Philippo to climb over a wall and through a window into her room.  The same scenario 
repeats itself for many nights until her husband is too frustrated to continue his watch.  Finally, 
he accuses his wife of the sins she revealed to him.  She replies that he was the friar with whom 
she had been sleeping as she recognized him as her confessor and embellished the story to teach 
him a lesson.  Her husband, unaware of her actual unfaithfulness, does learn his lesson and gives 
up his jealous ways.  As a result, his wife, free to enjoy living a more normal life, no longer felt 
it necessary to be unfaithful to her husband. 
 This story emphasizes the importance of trust to close interpersonal relationships by 
examining both the possibility of a close relationship without trust and a close relationship with 
trust.  The merchant and his wife’s relationship was stifled by the merchant’s lack of trust in his 
wife.  The jealousy the merchant felt as a result of his lack of trust drove his wife to find a more 
satisfying relationship with Philippo.  However, once the merchant began to trust his wife his 
relationship with her was revitalized to the point that she no longer needed to find 
companionship with someone else despite having a greater opportunity to do so. 
 There are even a few stories in Decameron that suggest the importance of treating others 
in close interpersonal relationships as ends in themselves.  Though the idea of treating others in 




stories, several of them show the pitfalls of failing to treat the other as an individual with his or 
her own desires and goals. 
 The tenth story of the second day of Decameron is one such story.  Signoir Ricciardo de 
Chinzica, a wise judge of poor physique, decides to take a beautiful young wife named 
Bertolomea.  However, on his wedding night his attempt to consummate the marriage fails to 
satisfy his new wife.  In response to this, and to avoid further discomfort on his own part, he 
explains to his wife that almost every day is a holy day on which it is inappropriate for the 
couple to have sex.  As a result, Bertolomea becomes increasingly frustrated with her husband’s 
lack of interest in her desires.  One day, on a recreational fishing trip, Bertolomea is kidnapped 
by a famous pirate named Pagamino.  While she is at first very upset, Pagamino’s kind treatment 
of her wins her over.  Ricciardo de Chinzica is able to meet Pagamino and ask for his wife to be 
returned to him.  Pagamino tells Ricciardo that he will let Bertolomea leave with him if she so 
desires it.  When Bertolomea comes before Pagamino and Ricciardo she acts as if she does not 
know Ricciardo.  Ricciardo gets Pagamino to allow Bertolomea to speak with him privately at 
which point she tells Ricciardo that she knows who he is but that he does not know her because 
he has blatantly ignored her desires and interests by treating her more as student than a wife.  She 
goes on to argue that her parents too ignored her good when they promised her to Ricciardo as a 
wife.  Conversely, Pagamino treats her as a true wife: with honor and respect.  Despite his 
protests Ricciardo is forced to leave Pagamino without his wife.  As a result he is disgraced and 
miserable in his home town and dies shortly thereafter.  At that point Pagamino and Bertolomea 
officially get married. 
 Bertolomea is frustrated and upset by her treatment at the hands of Ricciardo because her 




effect, she is unhappy with those relationships because she is not being treated as an end in 
herself, but as a means to something else.  Ricciardo marries her because he thinks his prestige as 
a judge entitles him to a beautiful wife.  In contemporary vernacular Ricciardo treats Bertolomea 
as a “trophy wife.”  Her parents, by marrying her to a man unfit for her, also seem to be after 
some end that is not in line with Bertolomea’s wishes.  Pagamino, despite holding a much less 
respectable post than Ricciardo, earns a close relationship with Bertolomea’s by treating her with 
respect and acknowledging her own wishes.  For example, when he tells Ricciardo that 
Bertolomea is free to return to him if that is what she so desires he treats Bertolomea as an end in 
herself.  For that reason, Bertolomea decides to pursue a relationship with Pagamino rather than 
Ricciardo. 
 Decameron touches on each of the pieces of a close interpersonal relationship that will be 
discussed in chapter three as defining features of what this dissertation terms “intimate 
relationships”: love, mutuality, trust, and treating the other as an end in himself or herself.  
Chapter three will add to this list that those people involved in intimate relationships must wish 
one another well and act for one another.  These characteristics are discussed in the stories 
already mentioned as well as most other stories in Decameron.  While no one story in the one 
hundred that make up Decameron describes all six of these components clearly, the fact that each 
of them plays a role in some story shows that interpersonal relationships with these traits 
captured the attention of Boccaccio and his readers.  The interest in what will be referred to as 
“intimate relationships” is not a new phenomenon.  Those authors whose own stories or writing 





These relationships, then, have long been and still are a part of human lives.  They are 
also significant and interesting else there would not be so many influential works of literature 
detailing their existence.  The question that remains, the question that this dissertation will 
examine, is whether and how that significance is translated into moral value by particular 
normative theories.   
Despite the long history of interest in close interpersonal relationships and the roles they 
play in real human lives, the question of how they fit into moral life has not been tackled 
philosophically as rigorously and as often as it has been in the last fifty years.  In 1971 Elizabeth 
Telfer gave a talk on friendship at the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London and later 
published the talk in the meeting’s proceedings.
5
  The paper aims to address three questions 
about friendship “… what it is, how morality bears on it, and why it is thought to be important.”
6
  
Whether intentional or not, whether causal or coincidental, Telfer’s attempt at defining 
friendship and exploring its place in normative theories preceded several important papers and 
books over the next few decades on the subject.  Two years after Telfer published her article, 
Bernard Williams’ “A Critique of Utilitarianism” attacked utilitarianism’s concept of negative 
responsibility on the grounds that it alienates people from their commitments to projects and 
relationships.
7
  That same year, 1973, Michael Stocker published “The Schizophrenia of Modern 
Ethical Theories” which criticizes Moore’s consequentialist theory of ethics, among others, for 
its inability to endorse loving others as ends in themselves.
8
  Both Williams and Stocker went on 
to publish other articles that focused and bolstered the claims they made in their 1973 papers.  
                                                 
5
 Telfer, E. 1971. “Friendship.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1971: 223–241.   
6
 Ibid. pg 223. 
7
 Williams, B. 1973. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In Utiltiarianism For and Against, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 116. (1998) 
8
 Stocker, M.  1973. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 73(14): pgs 458-




1977 saw the publication of three articles that explored the connections between Aristotle’s 
ethics and friendship by Julia Annas and John Cooper.  In 1980 Lawrence Blum published 
Friendship, Altruism and Morality, the first part of which is devoted to criticizing Kantianism for 
its inability to explain and value close interpersonal relationships.
9
  In the same year Sara 
Ruddick published “Maternal Thinking” as the beginning of an alternative way of doing ethics 
that is grounded in the relationship of mothering.
10
  This was followed in 1982 and 1984 by 
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development and Nel 
Noddings’ Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, respectively.
11
  Both 
books continued in the tract that Ruddick had started a couple years earlier: they proposed 
alternate approaches to ethics grounded in interpersonal relationships rather than the well 
established classifications of deontology and consequentialism.  Peter Railton also published 
“Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality” in 1984 as a consequentialist 
answer to the problems posed by Williams and Stocker.
12
  Railton’s article explicitly attempts to 
make room for the concept of friendship within the consequentialist framework.  In 1985 
Ferdinand Shoeman published yet another article on the value of friendship in Aristotle’s moral 
theory.
13
 In 1987 Neera Badhwar published “Friends as Ends in Themselves” as a detailed 
analysis of friendships in which the friends treat one another as ends in themselves.  In the last 
paragraph Badhwar makes a connection between friendships and morality.
14
  In 1991 Badhwar 
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focused more explicitly on the ties between friendship and morality in an article criticizing 
consequentialism for on its inability to value the relationships she defined in her 1987 article.  
Finally, in an introduction to a reader that Badhwar edited which was published in 1993, she 
undertakes the project of examining several different normative theories’ abilities to explain and 
value friendships as a means of introducing the articles collected in the reader.
15
   
While the above history is far from complete, it highlights some of the more significant 
work on the ability of specific normative theories to incorporate the value of close interpersonal 
relationships between 1971 and 1987.  Many more articles on the connections between ethics 
and interpersonal relationships have been published since 1987, but 1987 is significant because it 
marked the first of Badhwar’s papers on friendship and its relation to normative ethics.  Her 
interest in the topic grew and deepened into the closest approximation to the project that this 
dissertation takes up: a systematic analysis of multiple normative theories’ failures to account 
and successes in accounting for the value of close interpersonal relationships.   
Badhwar’s attempt at this project was impeded by several factors.  First, the purpose of 
the project was to serve as an introduction for a reader.  This prevented Badhwar from 
developing her argument in sufficient detail.  Second, the value terms she uses in the article 
obscure differences between the theories she examines.
16
 Third, she does not compare the 
conclusions she reaches about each normative theory that she examines.  As a result she is 
unable to draw any wider conclusions about normative theories in general.  These are three 
problems I plan to avoid in this dissertation. 
I will analyze four theories of ethics in order to show that any normative theory which 
hopes to account for the value of intimate relationships (a sort of close interpersonal relationship) 
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must meet a series of necessary and sufficient conditions.  So long as one admits that such 
relationships are morally valuable, this set of necessary and sufficient conditions is an invaluable 
tool with which to appraise any normative theory’s practical plausibility. 
In order to synthesize the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative 
theory must meet to account for the value of intimate relationships several concepts needed in 
the analysis of the normative theories must be defined.  Since value itself is a multifaceted term 
the several most relevant and theoretically neutral classifications of value will be identified and 
precisely defined in chapter two.  Only then can the value terms be useful in an unbiased analysis 
of very different normative approaches to close interpersonal relationships.  In chapter three, the 
close interpersonal relationships themselves will be examined as the term “intimate relationship” 
is defined to be more inclusive than the term “friendship.”  The value terms explained in chapter 
two will then be applied in the succeeding four chapters to analyze the way in which Kantianism, 
G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, Aristotle’s virtue theory, and Virginia Held’s ethics of care 
assign value to the relationships defined in chapter three.   
These four theorists and the theories they propose have been selected for two reasons.  
First, each theorist explicitly or implicitly claims that intimate relationships, or some subset of 
intimate relationships, are morally valuable.  Second, each theory assigns intimate relationships a 
different sort of value.  The respective failures and successes of each theory to account for the 
value of intimate relationships serve as premises in the argument for a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  Accordingly, the first half of chapters three through six will show that the 
theorist being investigated discusses interpersonal relationships that qualify as intimate 
relationships and argues that such relationships have moral value.  The later part of each chapter 




relationships that the theorist acknowledges they possess.  Then, chapter eight will collect the 
conclusions of the analyses that take place in chapters three through six and use them to create 
the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that can be used to appraise any normative theory’s 
ability to value intimate relationships.  For actual people who treat their intimate relationships as 
having moral value these conditions will be a guidepost toward determining which normative 






Chapter 2 – Value from Intrinsic to Instrumental 
 There are four categories of value that will be used in this dissertation to discuss the 
moral worth of interpersonal relationships: intrinsic, extrinsic, instrumental, and final value.  
These terms are used imprecisely and even interchangeably leading to confusion in debates about 
moral theorists’ appraisals of interpersonal relationships.  This problem becomes more 
significant when one attempts to compare the value of interpersonal relationships across different 
moral theories.  In order to address this problem and figure out how intimate relationships are 
valued one must clearly define these four kinds of value and show that they are theoretically 
neutral.  It will be helpful to start with an analysis of the many possible interpretations of the 
most general notion of positive value in ethics, or the good, and then move on to a more detailed 
examination of the specific senses of the term that are most relevant to a discussion of 
interpersonal relationships’ value. W.D. Ross and A.C. Ewing examine many possible meanings 
of the word “good” in their works and each will be reviewed to see whether it is significant to the 
present inquiry.  Both refer to G.E. Moore’s attempt to answer the question ‘What things have 
intrinsic value and in what degrees?’ in Principia Ethics.
17
  He explains the concept of intrinsic 
value further in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” hereafter referred to as CIV.
18
  While doing 
so, Moore also lays the foundation for a definition of extrinsic value that will help categorize the 
kind of good that interpersonal relationships may possess.  Fred Feldman examines Moore’s 
view and offers several competing definitions of intrinsic value in his article “Hyperventilating 
about Intrinsic Value.”
19
  Each of these must be discussed to figure out whether Moore’s concept 
of intrinsic good is the most useful for an analysis of value across different moral theories.  
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Christine Korsgaard considers Moore’s view of intrinsic value too and concludes that final value 
should be defined as distinct from intrinsic value.
20
  In so doing, Korsgaard also sets up 
instrumental goodness as distinct from extrinsic goodness. 
Part I:  Various Uses of “Good” 
 “Good” and “positively valuable” will be used interchangeably in this dissertation; yet, 
both phrases have many meanings in the English language and they vary significantly.  Saying 
that a particular relationship is good can therefore mean many different things.  In chapter four of 
Ewing’s The Definition of Good, hereafter DG, he identifies ten different ways to define the 
word “good.”
 21
  Many of the same definitions are discussed by Ross in chapter three of The 
Right and the Good, hereafter RG.
22
  These definitions can be roughly grouped into four 
categories: instrumental goodness, comparative goodness, specific goodness, and intrinsic 
goodness.
23
  Some of these are vital to the discussion of intimate relationships which follows this 
chapter, and others are beside the point of this dissertation.   
 Ewing’s first four definitions of “good” all relate to what this dissertation will refer to as 
instrumental goodness. Instrumental goodness in its most general form is Ewing’s fourth 
definition of “good.”   Rather than use the term “instrumental goodness” Ewing simply writes 
that something good in the fourth sense of the word is a means to an intrinsically good end (DG 
113).  This general type of good is also exemplified by Ewing’s first three definitions of “good.”  
Ewing first identifies goodness with something which is pleasant or liked (DG 112).  Next, he 
examines the idea that “goodness” can be attributed to that which will satisfy one’s desires.  
Ewing’s third definition for “good” is performing a particular function efficiently; this is one of 
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the “root ideas” expressed by “good” according to Ross (DG 112, RG 65).  In fact, Ross writes 
that the first two definitions that Ewing mentions reduce to this third definition (DG 112, RG 65).  
Particular relationships can be, and often are, good in each of these ways. However, these are not 
the uses of “good” on which this dissertation will focus.  Intimate relationships do provide 
pleasure, satisfy desires, and perform certain functions efficiently.  Yet, if the entire goodness of 
intimate relationships is captured by any of these features, then their goodness can be more 
generally described as instrumental: good for the sake of the effects they produce.  Whether the 
relevant effect is the production of pleasure, satisfaction of desire, or performance of some 
function will be beside the point because the more general characterization of this goodness as 
instrumental will be sufficient for the arguments in the following chapters.  Instrumental 
goodness will be discussed again later in this chapter as a contrast to final goodness. 
The fifth definition of “good” described by Ewing also deals with efficiency: rather than 
describing something or someone that is efficiently performing a function, this meaning of 
“good” is for something or some action to be efficient (DG 113-114).  The difference between 
definitions three and five is the difference between calling the swing of a baseball bat good for 
causing a homerun and calling the same swing good because of its internal mechanics, even if it 
results in a strikeout.  In a sense, Ewing’s fifth definition is a comparative evaluation in light 
other things of the same kind.  Ross identifies a similar meaning of “good” when he writes that it 
can refer to an object or person that is an above average member of its kind (RG 66-67).  Ross 
explicitly states that good in this sense is used as a comparative to indicate that a thing is better 
than the average of its kind.  This directly links to Ewing’s fifth definition when Ewing writes 
that the “good of a species” meaning of “good” reduces to definition five when it is meant to 




can be compared to one another in this way too.  Certain relationships could be termed more 
efficient and thus better than others; in other words, certain relationships might fulfill the 
defining features of that sort of relationship better than others.  The goal of this dissertation, 
however, is to examine the value of a particular category of relationship as a whole rather than to 
make comparisons within the category.  Therefore, the fifth definition of “good” that Ewing 
identifies will not be relevant to this dissertation. 
The eighth, ninth, and tenth definitions of “good” that Ewing identifies apply to 
characteristics, actions, and persons respectively.  The eighth type of good describes a 
characteristic that makes objects that possess it good (DG 116).  According to Ewing, this type of 
characteristic can make an object good intrinsically or as a means to an intrinsically good end 
(DG 116).  Ewing’s ninth and tenth definitions of “goodness” deal with moral goodness.  
“Good” when used to describe an action’s moral value is being used in Ewing’s ninth sense (DG 
116).  Ross seems to be in agreement when he identifies actions as the sort of things that can be 
intrinsically good (RG 134).  He writes at the beginning of his chapter entitled “What Things Are 
Good?”, in a similar vein to Ewing,  
The first thing for which I would claim that it is intrinsically good is virtuous disposition 
and action, i.e. action, or disposition to act, from any one of certain motives, of which at 
all events the most notable are the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring into being 
something that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to others” (RG 134). 
The moral goodness of actions, specifically actions that comprise and perpetuate intimate 
relations, will be a central focus of this dissertation.  “Good” can also be used to describe a 
person’s moral character and this is the usage indicated by Ewing’s tenth sense of “good” (DG 




moral character of the person will be discussed briefly in chapter six: Aristotle discusses 
character as it relates to interpersonal relationships.
24
 
The sixth and seventh definitions of “good” Ewing mentions both relate to intrinsic 
goodness.  The sixth definition of “good” that he discusses he terms “intrinsic good,” but it is 
defined differently by Ewing than it is by Moore since he says this sense of good means “good as 
an end” (DG 114).  In fact, Ewing’s description of “intrinsic goodness” seems more similar to 
what will be termed “final value” later in this chapter as he explicitly sets it up as the opposite of 
good as a means (DG 114).  Contrary to what will be explored later as Moore’s view of intrinsic 
value, Ewing says that intrinsic good does not mean good in all contexts or if everything else in 
the universe was different (DG 114).  Ross too discusses intrinsic value as the second predicative 
type of good, but his definition is much closer to that of Moore (RG 68).  Moore’s definition will 
be discussed later in this chapter as well.   
Ultimate goodness, also a Moorean concept, is that which Ewing describes as the seventh 
type of good, and Ross describes this as the third type of predicative good (DG 114-115, RG 68-
72).
25
  Both Ewing and Ross explicitly follow Moore’s definition of ultimate good which leads to 
their similarities.  Ultimately good things are either intrinsically good unities, that is they have no 
pieces, or comprised of pieces which are all individually intrinsically good.  Things that have 
neutral or bad parts, but are still good overall, could be intrinsically good; however, they could 
not be ultimately good.  The definition of ultimate goodness implies stricter criteria than that of 
intrinsic goodness.  The applicability of ultimate goodness to intimate relationships may be 
interesting but is not argued for by any of the normative theorists discussed in this dissertation.  
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Moreover, it is unnecessary to the claims of this dissertation that intimate relationships be 
ultimately good. 
Part II:  A Further Explanation of the Relevant Uses of “Good” 
Despite the many uses of the word “good,” investigations into the moral value of 
relationships focus on four senses of the word: intrinsic goodness, extrinsic goodness, 
instrumental goodness, and final goodness.  However, even these terms need to be clearly 
defined since different philosophers use them differently.  The first step in defining them is to 
see which account of intrinsic goodness will best serve the purpose of categorizing different 
accounts of value without simultaneously judging certain normative theories to be inferior to 
others.  Once that task is completed extrinsic value can be defined as intrinsic value’s opposite.  
Finally, final goodness will be distinguished from intrinsic goodness since it describes a different 
theoretically neutral facet of value. 
Moore writes that to figure out which things have intrinsic value, in the sense referred to 
by Ross, “… it is necessary to consider which things are such that, if they existed in themselves, 
in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good …”
26
  This method of 
considering the goodness of something alone and separate from everything else in existence has 
become known as the “isolation test” of intrinsic goodness.  According to Moore, this test 
accomplishes two tasks essential to determining whether something is intrinsically good.  First, it 
shows that the thing is not merely a means to some other good since, according to the thought 
experiment, nothing else exists for the thing in question to effect.  Second, it allows one to 
accurately compare the relative goodness of one piece of a larger whole to the goodness of that 
whole. 
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This sense of intrinsic value is unbiased.  The fact that object A’s value is independent of 
other objects does not affect the value of object A.  Object A is not bad, nor less good, if its value 
is dependent on object B.  Moreover, investigating whether object A’s value is dependent on 
other objects or circumstances does not necessarily influence the appraisal of a normative theory 
of ethics.  One can classify the goodness of the Kantian good will or pleasure as intrinsic or not 
without claiming that the good will is better or worse than pleasure or that Kantianism is a more 
accurate account of morality. 
 In his later article entitled “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore explicitly defines 
intrinsic value when he writes, “To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the 
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the 
intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (CIV 260).  Moore then goes on to explain the 
implications of this definition.  First, he specifies that value of this sort depends on the internal 
properties of the object.  Thus, the value must be exactly the same at all times under all possible, 
rather than merely actual, circumstances (CIV 267).  Moore is explicit about this in order to 
eliminate the possibility that the examined object’s interaction with actual causal laws results in 
the object’s value, making the value reliant on its relationship with causal laws rather than its 
intrinsic properties.  He goes on to state that numerical difference is not enough to affect intrinsic 
value; two objects that are exactly the same, or copies of one another, must also share the same 
intrinsic value despite being two separate objects (CIV 262).  In other words, the physical 
distinctness of two objects cannot make a difference to their intrinsic properties because that 
distinctness is a relational feature as opposed to an intrinsic one.  Moore is also careful to point 




values (CIV 264).  A difference in the extent of a quality, like fluorescence, could be enough to 
change the intrinsic value of a diamond, for example.   
According to Moore intrinsic value is something to be gauged in isolation from other 
objects in order to confirm its non-relational and non-circumstantial nature.  For example, to 
decide whether a painting was intrinsically valuable according to Moore one would imagine that 
painting as being the only thing that ever existed in the universe.  In this case the painting’s value 
could not come from any observer, interest in the painting, or the historical context of the 
painting’s creation. 
Ralf Barton Perry in his General Theory of Value offers a contradictory view to Moore’s 
account of intrinsic value by arguing that all value is related to an interest taken in something.  
As he writes “Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is 
taken in it.”
27
 On this view all value comes from an object’s relationship to a person’s interest.  
For example, an autographed baseball is valuable insomuch as someone has interest in it.  This 
theory seems opposed to intrinsic value’s existence because it deems all value to be relational.  
This is problematic because intrinsic value is supposed to be non-relational by definition.  
Nevertheless, Perry maintains that his theory leaves room for intrinsic goodness.  Perry writes 
that Moore’s isolation test is a serious objection to his own view: “value would shine by a 
reflected glory having no original source.”
28
  He then addresses this problem by appealing to the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.  Synthetic judgments of goodness would 
require a distinct subject to make them, thereby failing the isolation test.  One could judge 
synthetically whether the autographed baseball was valuable, and this judgment would require a 
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subject to determine whether the baseball was valued.  Analytic judgments, on the other hand, 
would not necessitate a subject.
29
 A desired autographed baseball is valuable analytically and 
independent of a subject according to Perry.  
Ross, however, spends the first half of chapter four in The Right and The Good disputing 
Perry’s claim that his theory of value, or others like it, can allow for the existence of intrinsic 
value.  Ross, as a response to Perry’s claim that all value is related to an interest taken in 
something, writes: 
If ‘good’, then, be defined as Professor Perry defines it, nothing can be intrinsically good.  
And his attempt to get over the difficulty of the apparent necessity (for a relational view 
of value) of denying that anything has intrinsic value, by means of the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic judgements, comes to nothing. ‘O-desired-by-S’ is not a 
different object which can truly be said to possess intrinsic value when it is denied that 
any O apart from being desired has intrinsic value.  ‘O-desired-by-S is good’ is simply 
another way of saying ‘any O has value not in itself but by virtue of the co-existence with 
it, and in a certain relation to it, of S’. And to say this is to deny intrinsic value to 
anything (RG 77-78). 
Thus, Perry’s argument that analytic judgments of value pass Moore’s isolation test and can be 
considered intrinsically valuable fails.  Perry’s theory of value is incompatible with Moore’s 
definition of intrinsic value and would be more accurately understood as a theory about final 
value than Moorean intrinsic value. 
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 Feldman discusses Moore’s definition of intrinsic value alongside several others in his 
article “Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value.”
30
  Feldman first lists eight different ways in 
which philosophers have used the phrase ‘intrinsic good.’  Moore’s isolation test and definition 
account for two of those eight.   
Drawing on Aristotle and Plato, the first meaning of intrinsic good that Feldman 
identifies is unimprovable goodness.  Something that is an unimprovable good cannot be made 
better by the addition of other goods.  A painting that is unimprovably good cannot be made 
better by adding anything to it.  However, Feldman ends up rejecting this meaning of intrinsic 
good because it conflicts with a pluralistic account of goodness: a pluralistic account of goodness 
will always allow for the addition of a different sort of good to improve overall goodness.
31
  To 
return to the example of the painting, it might make sense if the only good were beauty.  It might 
be possible that the painting was unimprovably good in the sense that it was unimprovably 
beautiful, and if beauty were the only good then unimprovably beautiful would be identical with 
unimprovably good.  However, if one allows for other goods like accessibility or a pleasant 
smell, then surely the unimprovably beautiful painting can be made better by adding accessibility 
and a pleasant smell.  The sense of intrinsic goodness identified with unimprovability must be 
rejected for the purposes of this dissertation: this sense of intrinsic goodness could only sensibly 
apply to non-pluralistic accounts of ethics.  As a result only non-pluralistic accounts of ethics 
could consider intimate relationships good in this sense.  Since this dissertation is examining 
pluralistic accounts of ethics using the unimprovability criterion of intrinsic goodness would bias 
the results of the analysis against those theories of ethics. 
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The second meaning identified by Feldman comes from Aristotle: that intrinsic goodness 
is identified with the most final good.  Final goodness, however, will be dealt with next as 
separate from intrinsic goodness.  The purpose in separating intrinsic goodness and final 
goodness is that the two terms can be used to identify different features of the same value. 
  Kant’s use of unqualified goodness is the third definition of intrinsic goodness examined 
by Feldman.  This definition can be taken literally to mean that intrinsic goodness needs no 
qualifier, yet this would be an odd interpretation since “intrinsic” is already a qualifier.  On the 
other hand, by unqualified goodness Kant might mean incorruptibility which is the seventh 
possible meaning for intrinsic goodness identified by Feldman. 
The fourth definition of intrinsic goodness is attributed to Brentano.  He argues that 
intrinsically good things are the correct objects of intrinsic love.  To accept this definition one 
must first accept Brentano’s theory of psychology and the fittingness of emotions such as love.  
Yet to do so would be to accept so many of Brentano’s premises that the application of this 
account of intrinsic value to other normative theories would either not make sense or simply 
indicate a theory’s agreement or disagreement with Brentano’s.  This definition of intrinsic value 
has too much theoretical baggage to be used as unbiased criterion by which to measure different 
normative theories of ethics.   
The fifth and sixth definitions that Feldman examines are Moore’s.  Each has already 
been discussed.   
The seventh, again, is incorruptibility.  Feldman attributes this definition to Kant and 




circumstance, and in all possible worlds.  This definition is usable because, like Moore’s 
definition, it does not change the goodness of an object to describe it as incorruptible.  Nor does 
identifying a theory’s ability to assign incorruptible goodness to an object make that theory a 
more plausible account of ethics.  
Finally, Feldman discusses Chisholm’s view that intrinsically good things are those 
which ought to exist.  Yet, similar to Brentano’s definition, one must accept a particular view of 
what ought to exist in order to understand and accept this definition.  It would be exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate each of the normative theories discussed in this 
dissertation on the basis of this definition since some do not even address whether objects or 
events ought to exist.  Furthermore, even those theories that do address things that ought to exist 
would be judged by Chisholm’s standard if this account of intrinsic value were utilized to 
evaluate different moral theories: those theories that agreed the most with Chisholm’s view 
would be favored by this account of intrinsic value.  However, the point of this dissertation is to 
use value classifications in an unbiased analysis of different normative theories.  Thus, this 
account of intrinsic goodness will not meet the purpose of this dissertation. 
 Feldman concludes his review of the possible meanings of intrinsic value by claiming 
that two of the eight original definitions seem promising, but are incomplete and point in 
different directions: Moore’s view that intrinsic goodness is dependent on intrinsic nature and the 
view that intrinsic goodness is incorruptible.
32
  Feldman calls them incomplete because neither 
criterion identifies a specifically moral sort of goodness.  This sort of incompleteness, however, 
is not problematic from the point of view of this dissertation.  Whether “intrinsic goodness” can 
be applied to non-moral goods such as the validity of an argument is beside the point of figuring 
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out which of the normative theories that will be examined in this dissertation can be said to 
attribute intrinsic goodness to intimate relationships.  Furthermore, it is not clear that the two 
definitions do point in completely different directions.  Reliance on intrinsic nature and 
incorruptibility do offer distinct interpretations of intrinsic goodness, but Moore’s careful 
definition in “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” reveals some important similarities.   
According to Moore, because intrinsic value is determined by a thing’s intrinsic nature it 
does not change between possible worlds.  Moore even writes “A kind of value is intrinsic if and 
only if, when anything possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily 
or must always, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree” (CIV 265).  A 
thing’s intrinsic nature is independent of how it is utilized by someone or how it interacts with 
different causal laws.  For example, if a baseball bat is intrinsically good on Moore’s definition it 
is also incorruptible.  On Moore’s view, the baseball bat’s intrinsic properties, such as the type 
and quality of wood it is made from, would be the source of its goodness.  The baseball bat’s 
intrinsic properties remain unchanged whether in the hands of a sweet-swinging third baseman, a 
terrible hitting pitcher, or a murderer; therefore, its intrinsic goodness too would remain 
unchanged.  Even in the hands of a murder the bat would be considered intrinsically good: since 
its intrinsic properties are not changed by the murder it cannot become intrinsically bad or even 
intrinsically less good which is why Moore considers intrinsic good incorruptible.  Moore’s 
definition is stricter than that of incorruptibility and necessity since it may be possible for these 
properties not to be based entirely on intrinsic nature.  For example, if object A’s incorruptible or 
necessary goodness relied on some extrinsic relationship that existed between it and object B in 
every possible world and every possible circumstance, then object A would still not be 




though that something (object B) existed in every possible world and circumstance.  However, 
any intrinsically good object must also be incorruptible and necessarily good; since object A’s 
goodness is not reliant on anything in the world it will be good regardless of the possible world 
or circumstance into which it is placed. 
 Intrinsic value’s opposite, extrinsic value, is marked by its relational and/or 
circumstantial nature.  Relational aspects of an object’s value include the relationships between 
an object and a larger whole, to a causal chain, or to an observer.  An example of relational value 
is the value of speed in a baseball player.  Speed alone is worth very little in a baseball player 
because without any other skills that baseball player cannot help his team win.  However, the 
value of speed in a baseball player increases dramatically when coupled with other skills such as 
the ability to consistently make solid contact with pitches or fielding prowess.  Circumstantial 
aspects of an object’s value are often related the object’s particular history.  For example, the 
value of a sacrifice bunt in a particular baseball game is largely determined by the plays that 
precede and succeed it.  The important feature of extrinsic value is its reliance on features 
outside the object rather than internal ones.  Extrinsic value, like intrinsic value, is also theory 
neutral.  Classifying a value as extrinsic does not necessarily bear on the positive or negative 
nature of that value; in other words, objects may be extrinsically good or bad.  Simply 
identifying that the location of an object’s value as outside the object or related to some other 
object does not change the value of the object either. 
Korsgaard, in “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” argues that intrinsic goodness and final 
goodness are importantly different.  According to Korsgaard the two concepts answer different 




way we value the thing.”
33
  Final goodness, on the other hand, is a concept that identifies how we 
value something: as something good for its own sake rather than the sake of its consequences.  
To claim that something has final goodness is to value it for what it is rather than for that to 
which it may lead. Intrinsic goodness is sometimes posed as the opposite of instrumental 
goodness, but this conflates questions about the source of a thing’s goodness with questions 
about how a thing is valued.  One need only reflect back on Moore’s definition of intrinsic 
goodness to clarify this distinction.  An object is intrinsically good because of its internal 
features, or intrinsic properties.  Its goodness comes from itself.  Conversely, for Moore the 
question of an object’s intrinsic goodness has nothing to do with how someone treats the object.  
Whether a person treats an object as a means or an end has no bearing on that thing’s intrinsic 
goodness on Moore’s view.  On the other hand, whether an object is treated as a means or an end 
does determine whether that object can be considered to be a final good.  Korsgaard admits that 
it is possible for intrinsic value and instrumental value to be opposites, but only under the 
influence of a specific normative or metaphysical theory.  One could claim that all intrinsically 
good things should be valued as ends or final goods, but this would require either a large 
normative assumption or significant argument.  Korsgaard explains some of the impossibilities 
that result from ignoring the distinction between intrinsic and final goods.  If all final goods were 
intrinsically valuable, then no object with a value dependent on relational properties could be 
valuable as more than a means to some other end.  However, certain objects are valuable as ends 
despite that value relying on relational or circumstantial features.  For example, the famous T-
206 Honus Wagner baseball card’s incredible value comes from its rarity, a clearly relational 
property.  Yet, someone who purchases the card could value its rarity for its own sake rather than 
as a means to pleasure or future financial gain.  The card would then have final value but lack 
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intrinsic value.  Therefore, final goodness and intrinsic goodness must be separable.  Their 
opposites, instrumental and extrinsic goodness respectively, are also separable.   
Like intrinsic and extrinsic value, final value and instrumental value are theory neutral.  
The terms “final value” and “instrumental value” are merely tools for classifying how a good is 
valued: as an ends or a means.  Defining a particular good as instrumentally valuable does not 
change its value.  Additionally, classifying the goods identified by a particular normative theory 
as instrumental or final does not make a theory more or less plausible as such. 
C.I. Lewis provides an example of extrinsic value that is not merely a means to some 
other end when he describes contributive value.  According to Lewis, experiences have 
contributory value if they modify the felt value in another experience rather than merely causing 
the felt value.  The felt value is the value recognized by the person experiencing the value.
34
  The 
modification can be either unidirectional or bidirectional and can directly affect final value.  
Lewis provides the example of a boy working for the price of a circus ticket.  The work is not 
merely instrumentally valuable if the boy’s enjoyment of the circus is increased by having earned 
the enjoyment through his own work.
35
  If the good of working was merely instrumental, then the 
boy would get x amount of pleasure from the circus whether he earned the ticket or got it for 
free.  However, in Lewis’ example the boy gets x+y pleasure from attending the circus after 
earning the ticket: the extra pleasure denoted by y marks the good that was contributed by the 
work to the boy’s overall experience of pleasure.  Thus, the work is not an end in itself.  Nor is it 
merely a means to the pleasure he gets from only experiencing the circus.  The work, by 
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changing the experience of the circus for the boy, is neither instrumentally nor finally valuable: it 
has contributory value. 
 Final goodness is correctly contrasted with instrumental goodness.  Objects that are 
instrumentally good are not valued for their own sakes but as stepping stones to some other 
goods, or means to some other ends.  For example, the goodness of cash is instrumental in most 
cases.  Cash is usually valued for its ability to get something else: either another instrumental 
good or a final good.  All instrumental goods must eventually lead to some final good which is 
valued for its own sake.  One might use instrumentally good cash to purchase a baseball cap that 
one considers to be valuable as an end, as a souvenir.  Alternately, the cap may be instrumentally 
valuable in keeping one’s head warm and providing a more pleasant experience during a windy 
game (the pleasant experience being the final good in this case).  The monetary value of the cap 
may be the same, but its value to the purchaser in each case is different.  As a souvenir the cap is 
treated as good for simply being what it is: a cap bought at a baseball game.  As something that 
will keep one’s head warm the cap is only valuable insofar as it leads to the final end of a more 
pleasurable experience of the game.  
This dissertation will utilize the four types of goodness just discussed to evaluate each 
normative theory’s treatment of intimate relationships in chapters four through seven.  The 
importance of whether intimate relationships are intrinsically, extrinsically, instrumentally, or 
finally valuable will be examined in chapter three.  These four terms, as they have just been 
defined, are especially useful in comparing values of different moral theories because they do 
not, in and of themselves, have normative significance.  This allows one to apply them to a 




goodness were rejected precisely because they did not share this characteristic.  Their views of 
goodness are not normatively neutral.  The only ways to apply them to Aristotle’s view of 
interpersonal relationships’ value would be either to judge Aristotle’s view as incorrect or to alter 
Aristotle’s view of interpersonal relationships to fit the general view of value.  This is not the 
case with Moore’s view of intrinsic goodness.  Interpersonal relationships are either intrinsically 
good or not according to Moore’s definition of intrinsic goodness.  One need not make a further 
normative judgment about the importance of intrinsic goodness to an accurate account of 
morality in general or interpersonal relationships in particular.
36
  The same is true of extrinsic, 
instrumental, and final goods. 
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Chapter 3: Intimate Relationships 
Part I: Definition 
There are many different types of interpersonal relationship and each might be valuable 
in some respect.  Yet, to examine the value of every type of interpersonal relationship on each 
type of normative theory would be too large a project.  Instead, the scope of relationships 
examined in this dissertation will be limited to the set of relationships I define below as intimate 
relationships: relationships between individuals that are supposed to be significantly closer than 
acquaintances but not restricted to only the closest of friends.  The purpose of this definition is to 
separate out the sorts of relationships that are endorsed by Immanuel Kant, G.E. Moore, 
Aristotle, and Virginia Held in the subsequent chapters.  The resulting definition points to those 
relationships most likely to be considered morally valuable without leaving out morally 
significant relationships that do not fall under the standard definitions of friendship. 
Intimate relationships
37
 are those in which the involved individuals love, wish each other 
well, and act for each other as ends in themselves.  Loving, wishing well, and acting for one 
another as ends are often discussed as necessary conditions of friendship; however, here the 
conditions of loving, wishing, and acting for one other as ends will be both necessary and 
sufficient for an interpersonal relationship’s description as intimate.  This is dissimilar to 
discussions of friendship which commonly add other requirements to the list of sufficient 
conditions such as: equality between the relations and choice in the creation of the relationship.  
Loving, wishing, and acting for each member of the relationship for her own sake are the 
distinguishing marks of an intimate relationship; they have also been seen as necessary 
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conditions for the best sort of friendship.  The idea of loving, wishing another well, and acting 
for another as an end in herself can be broken down into six component pieces, each of which is 
important to close relationships: loving another, wishing another well, acting for the other 
person, doing so in a way that regards the other person as an end in herself, doing so mutually or 
for one another, and trusting that the other loves and wishes one well as an end in herself.   
To love another, in terms of intimate relationships, means to have strong positive 
emotions toward the other person that give rise to pleasure when in the presence of the other 
person.
38
  Additionally, the positive emotions and the pleasure one experiences when in the 
presence of the other person are stronger than those experienced in the presence of someone that 
is liked rather than loved.  Aristotle points out that, while not merely for the sake of pleasure, the 
best kind of friendship is certainly pleasant.
39
  Elizabeth Telfer explains the positive feelings 
friends experience in one another’s presence as part of the “passions” of friendship.  She writes 
that there is a desire to be with one’s friends and that this desire gives rise to pleasure when one 
spends time with one’s friends.
40
  Neera Badhwar, in examining the question of love, writes: 
“This exclusion of pleasure from the phenomenon of love is, however, false to experience… one 
cannot love a person without delighting in her under some aspect…”
41
 David Annis too identifies 
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Wishing the other person in the relationship well is the second component of friendships 
that is also an important part of intimate relationships.  To wish another well simply means to 
want good things for that person.  Wishing another well can mean, among other things, wishing 
for the other’s happiness, health, and/or success.  Aristotle writes in the Rhetoric “We may 
describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, 
not for your own sake but for his… A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in 
return…”
44
  Telfer claims that affection is a necessary condition of friendship and writes “I 
define 'affection' as a desire for another's welfare and happiness as a particular individual.”
45
  
Badhwar echoes the same sentiment when she writes “The best, most complete friendships are 
those in which friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves…”
46
  The desire for 
the other person’s good is seen as distinct from, but complimentary to, the pleasure one gets from 
the other’s company. 
Wishing another well as an end in herself is not enough without taking action for the 
other person’s sake.  Reciprocal goodwill is an important part of intimate relations, but when it 
consistently fails to result in any action there is reason to doubt that the relationship is an 
intimate one.  Annis, in discussing friendship, writes 
It isn't merely that it is nice for friends to help, to provide psychological support, but that 
we expect friends to act this way, are surprised if they don't, and frequently feel betrayed 
and not just harmed if they intentionally let us down… Not helping seems inconsistent 
with the friendship, and if it happens often, the friendship has been abandoned.
47
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Telfer agrees and lists several tangible examples of things friends are expected to do for one 
another: “… to help the friend when under attack (physical or verbal) or in need or trouble of any 
kind; to proffer advice and criticism, not only when asked for but also when not asked for but 
needed.”
48
  Intimate relationships also require that wishing the other well translates into acting 
for the other in some cases.  The form such action must take, however, will vary greatly 
depending on the individuals involved in the relationships and their abilities.
49
  One’s actions for 
the other may be outstripped by one’s wishes for the other.  This point becomes important when 




The third component of close relationships is that the other is loved, wished well, and 
acted for as an end in herself.  This is a vital component of intimate relationships like close 
friendships because it differentiates them from less personal relationships.  The condition of 
loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself, in the context of intimate 
relationships, means two things: treating the other as a goal rather than a means to some other 
good and treating the other as a particular individual rather than an abstract representation.   
As Aristotle makes clear in Nicomachean Ethics, relationships in which friends 
participate in order to gain some utility or pleasure are not of the highest sort.
51
  Neither the 
relationship itself nor the other person is the targeted value in relationships where the others are 
not loved or wished well as ends in themselves; instead, there is some other value aimed at by 
continuing the relationship.  Furthermore, in these relationships the other person is a means to 
utility and/or pleasure and might be replaced with a more efficient means or when the use and/or 
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pleasure is no longer obtained from that person.  As Badhwar writes, “A friend who is loved as 
an end is numerically irreplaceable in the sense that she is not a means to a happiness which can 
be better or as well served by another”
52
  Annis adds that “At least part of the concern in 
friendship must be altruistic, that is a concern for our friend’s welfare for the sake of the 
friend.”
53
  Therefore, loving, wishing, and acting for another as an end in herself are indicative of 
the irreplaceability of the other in the relationship, one person valuing the other and/or 
relationship directly, and one person making the other the object of concern in the relationship. 
Badhwar and Telfer both argue that treating a friend as an end in herself also necessitates 
recognizing that friend’s particular nature.  Badhwar’s article, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” 
is devoted to explaining the difference between means love and ends love in friendships and 
concludes that loving someone as an end in herself means loving the “unique and irreplaceable” 
in that person.
54
  Badhwar arrives at this conclusion by comparing the love that exists in 
friendship to unconditional or blind love.
55
  She argues that the love involved in friendships is a 
response to the friend’s particular qualities and the sort of love that is bestowed without regard to 
such qualities cannot be the foundation of friendship.
56
  In comparing particular types of 
unconditional and instrumental love Badhwar writes “Their difference is only that in one the 
individual target is regarded as an end, in the other, as a means.  But in neither is the individual 
loved for the unique character or personality that makes him the distinct person he is, as he must 
be in the end love of friendship.”
57
  Telfer notes that the desire for another’s good in friendship is 
“… to be distinguished both from sense of duty and from benevolence.  For these motives 
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prompt us to seek others' good in general, whereas we want to say that those who feel affection 
feel a concern for another which they do not feel for everyone.”
58
  Both argue, in effect, that the 
other person in a friendship must be loved for who she is as an individual as opposed to being 
loved for her human dignity, autonomous nature, or some other generally shared quality.  As 
mentioned previously, for two people to be close friends there must be positive feelings toward 
each other that give rise to pleasure when in each other’s company.  If the pleasure they take in 
each other’s presence is not significantly different than the pleasure taken in a stranger’s 
presence, then love fails to differentiate between friends and strangers.  Yet, this is empirically 
false because the pleasure and positive emotions felt for a friend are different than those felt for 
a stranger; in fact, this is part of what differentiates a friend from a stranger.   
Mutuality is the fourth component of intimate relationships.  For two people to be 
intimate relations both must love, wish the other well, and act for the other as an end in herself.  
Intimate relationships cannot be unidirectional.  Aristotle writes “But to those who thus wish 
good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal 
being friendship.”
59
  The love, wishes, and actions must be granted to each member of the 
relationship for it to count as intimate rather than some other type of relationship. 
In discussions of friendships the requirement of equality is sometimes added to the 
criterion of mutuality.  For example, Badhwar writes “I define friendship as a practical and 
emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure”
60
 Laurence Thomas 
argues that deep friendships are marked by the absence of authority of one friend over another.
61
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However, other writers do not see equality as a necessary component of friendships.  Aristotle 
writes: 
In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e.  the better 
should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each 
of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a 
sense arises equality, which is certainly help to be a characteristic of friendship.
62
 
Equality here might mean a couple of different things.  It might mean that the people involved in 
the relationship are moral equals or of equal moral worth; however, Badhwar, Thomas, and 
Aristotle seem to mean something quite different.
 63
   Rather than discussing whether friends 
must be moral equals, Badhwar asserts that friends must reciprocate equally at least on an 
emotional level.  Thomas is primarily concerned about two friends being on equal authoritative 
footing over one another.  Even Aristotle discusses the possibility of two socially unequal people 
being friends. Yet, two people do not need to be equal in any of these ways to love, wish the 
other well, and act for the other as an end in herself.  Furthermore, the love, wishes, and actions 
that each member of the relationship undertakes for the other’s sake may be uneven in intimate 
relations.  For example, the number and complexity of the actions that a parent performs for a 
child may be far greater than those that a child performs for a parent.  As long as the child acts 
for her parent for the parent’s own sake as an end, that child would still meet the mutuality 
criterion of intimate relationships (in terms of acting).  In light of these points and the fact that 
the term ‘intimate relationships’ is intended to describe a wider range of relationships than just 









the deepest friendships, there is no need for intimate relationships to meet such equality criteria 
as those discussed by Badhwar, Thomas, and Aristotle.
64
 
 The final component of intimate relationships is trust that the other will love, wish one 
well, and act for the other as an end in herself.  Annis and Thomas both identify trust as central 
to close friendships.
65,66 
 Thomas, for example, includes “an enormous bond of mutual trust” as 
one of the three defining features of companion friendships.
67
  Annette Baier’s article “Trust and 
Antitrust” delves into the variety and significance of trust in interpersonal relationships.
68
  She 
provides the following definition of trust: “Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other 
persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares 
about, where such "caring for" involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”
69
  In the case of 
intimate relationships the something being cared for is the other person and the care being 
offered takes the form of loving, wishing well, and acting for the other’s sake.  Baier also 
explores the psychological aspect of trust indicating that it may be unconscious, conscious but 
unchosen, or consciously cultivated.
70
  This is important to the definition of intimate 
relationships because it allows children and mentally disabled people who may not understand 
the concept of trust to participate in intimate relationships despite an inability to consciously 
chose or cultivate trust.
71
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Additionally, it also opens up the possibility that trust need not be acknowledged in a 
relationship.
72
  For example, Steve and Jared may reveal what they consider secrets to one 
another in conversation without explicitly asking one another to keep the conversations private.  
Instead, they may unconsciously rely on one another’s discretion and well wishing to prevent 
their words from being repeated to other people.  As Baier writes, proper trust must be able to 
survive its revelation but need not actually be revealed.
73
  Baier is also careful to point out that 
trust is not always morally good and sets out to distinguish morally good trust from morally 
problematic trust.  She concludes 
A trust relationship is morally bad to the extent that either party relies on qualities in the 
other which would be weakened by the knowledge that the other relies on them.  Where 
each relies on the other's love, or concern for some common good, or professional pride 
in competent discharge of responsibility, knowledge of what the other is relying on in one 
need not undermine but will more likely strengthen those relied-on features.
74
 
Since intimate relationships are marked by each person relying on the other’s loving, wishing, 
and acting, they exhibit a morally positive form of trust.   
 One criterion sometimes identified with close friendships that is not a component of 
intimate relationships is choice in the formation of the relationship.  Telfer and Thomas, for 
example, both discuss choice as being an important part of deep friendships and contrast 
friendships with the parent-child relationship.
75
 Yet, including choice as a criterion of intimate 
relationships is problematic for two reasons: it is unclear what level of choice is required of 
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friendships and there is no need to restrict intimate relationships to those that are freely 
undertaken.  Despite the fact that Telfer and Thomas include choice as one of the components of 
friendships, they both admit that the choice to become friends is partial at best.  Telfer includes 
involuntary passions as part of her account of friendship and must therefore admit that choice’s 
involvement in friendship is limited.  She writes “In this way my two necessary conditions are 
compatible with, and themselves imply, choice in friendship-though they also imply that we 
cannot choose to be a friend of just anyone, since the relevant passions cannot be summoned up 
at will.”
76
  Thomas concedes: “Yet, it is all too obvious that as a rule we do not self-consciously 
choose our friends in the way that we choose, say, the clothes that we wear.”
77
  Even if choice is 
a vital part of friendships, it is not a necessary part of the definition of the intimate relationships 
that this dissertation will examine.  Whether choice is a significant part of a relationship may be 
philosophically interesting and consequential, but it does not necessarily bear on the moral value 
of the relationship itself. 
Part II: Application of the Definition 
 The definition of intimate relationships can be applied in order to see which sorts of 
relationships can and cannot meet the aforementioned criteria.  Deep friendships such as those 
described by Aristotle, Badhwar, Telfer, Annis, and Thomas would be one subcategory of 
intimate relationships.  Relationships that are sometimes seen as more distant, such as those 
between playmates or sports teammates, might also count as intimate relationships: so long as 
the concern of each member of the relationship for the other extended beyond their roles in the 
mutual interest.  Many parent-child relationships could also count as long as the child was able to 
appreciate her parent as an end in herself.  Married couples, whether the result of arranged or 
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freely chosen marriage, could be intimate relations.  Even a romantic couple in which one or 
both members are cheating on their significant others could be in an intimate relationship with 
one another if both members of the couple could meet the aforementioned criterion of trust in 
addition to all the other criteria.  A mentally disabled person and her unrelated caretaker might 
be intimate relations too as long as the mentally disabled person possessed the mental faculties to 
understand her caretaker as an end in herself.   
Other relationships could not count as intimate ones.  For example, the relationship 
between two strangers would not meet the requirement of loving the other as an end in herself 
even if they both bore general goodwill to everyone.  Siblings whose competitiveness prevented 
them from sincerely wishing each other well as ends in themselves could not be intimate 
relations.  Two sports stars who mutually admired and even loved one another but never realized 
that admiration or love by acting for each other’s good would not be intimate relations.  A 
newborn baby cannot be a part of an intimate relationship because she cannot recognize another 
person as an end in herself.  Someone who loves, wishes well, and acts for another as an end in 
herself but whose love, wishes, and acts are not returned by the other is not in an intimate 
relationship. 
Intimate relationships are similar to close friendships because close friendships are one 
form of intimate relationship.  Thus, the two share the criteria of loving, wishing the other well, 
and acting for the other as an end in herself.  Each of the criteria is performed mutually and with 
trust in both intimate relationships and close friendships.  This is a good sign since Kant, Moore, 
and Aristotle directly discuss friendships.  However, intimate relationships include other 
relationships too.  By excluding the criteria of equality in the relationship and choice in the 




relationship” is able to include close relationships, like familial ones, that the term “friendship” 
cannot.  This too is important for the purposes of this dissertation since Aristotle and Held 
discuss relationships that do not fit into the category of friendship. 
The added benefit of including close friendships, close familial relationships, and 
romantic relationships under one more general heading is that these are the three categories of 
relationship most often attributed value by actual people in the world.  These are the relationships 
that almost everyone has, that authors have written about for millennia, and that are prime 
candidates for moral value.  If any category of relationship has moral value it is one or more of 
these three.  Other relationships may have moral value too, but what seems incredibly unlikely 
and contrary to human experience is that some other category of relationship that does not fall 
under the definition explained above has moral value while those relationships defined above as 
intimate do not.  That is the risk of restricting the discussion about the moral value of 
interpersonal relationships to only friendships, only familial relationships, or only romantic 
relationships: that one ends up examining the moral value of a sort of relationship that does not 
have moral value while some other category of relationship does have moral value.  By using a 
broader definition than that of friendship while retaining a majority of the features of friendship 
that have made it philosophically interesting I hope to mitigate that risk. 
Intimate relationships, then, are the relevant set of emotions, desires, and actions of two 
people that meet the aforementioned requirements for some length of time.
78
  An intimate 
relationship exists between the time that each member develops the relevant emotions and 
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desires and at least one member loses them.
79
  The time it takes for the psychological 
development and fading of these emotions and desires in actual people acts as a natural 
constraint on the length of intimate relationships.
80
  For example, loving someone else as an end 
in herself requires knowledge of that person and love in the face of such knowledge.  Yet, both 
the development of love and learning enough about another person to appreciate her as an end in 
herself take time.  Even if love for another were to appear before one had sufficient knowledge 
of another person as an end in herself, that love would not be enough to qualify the relationship 
as intimate until it survived the acquisition of the relevant knowledge.  Intimate relationships can 
end more quickly than they begin, as the trust required of intimate relations can sometimes be 
lost in a moment.  However, in many cases trust, loving another as an end in herself, and wishing 
another well as an end in herself persist for a significant amount of time even if there is little to 
no contact between the individuals involved in the relationship.  Thus, intimate relationships take 
a significant amount of time to form but once formed their length is more often measured in 
years than days. 
Part III: Intimate Relationships and Value 
 Intimate relationships and various types of value have been clearly defined, so the 
intersection of intimate relationships and value now bears examination.  The two questions about 
value that Korsgaard identifies in “Two Distinctions in Goodness” can be applied to intimate 
relationships: what is the location of an intimate relationship’s goodness and how does one value 
an intimate relationship.
81
  An intimate relationship may be good in-itself or its goodness might 
be related to something other than the relationship itself.  In neither case does the account of the 
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value’s location conflict with the idea of an intimate relationship.  However, the way in which 
one values a relationship does determine whether that relationship can be considered an intimate 
one.  One who values one’s relationship with another person as merely instrumentally good 
cannot, by definition, be involved in an intimate relationship with that other person.
82
  Only 
relationships that are valued as final goods are viable candidates for intimate relationships.  The 
subjectivity or objectivity of intimate relationships’ value also warrants discussion due to the 
partiality that such relationships require of their participants. 
 Intimate relationships can be described as having either intrinsic or extrinsic value.  
Intimate relationships have intrinsic value if their value comes from their intrinsic nature.  
Perhaps the simplest way to intuitively gauge whether intimate relationships have intrinsic value 
is to subject them to Moore’s isolation test: is the existence of an intimate relationship, in 
absolute isolation from everything besides the people involved, judged to be good?
83
  Moore 
supposes that an affirmative answer to this question would indicate that the goodness of intimate 
relationships must depend, at least in part, on their intrinsic properties since only these properties 
would exist in such simple universes.  On the other hand, negative answers to these questions 
would indicate that the goodness of intimate relationships is merely extrinsic: that it must depend 
on the association of the intimate relationship with other objects rather than the relationship’s 
internal features.  Each of the theorists discussed in the subsequent chapters will offer an account 
of intimate relationships’ value that can be classified as at intrinsic or extrinsic.   
The differences between the theorists’ stances on the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of 
intimate relationships’ value does not impact an agent’s ability to foster such relationships.  
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Many of the philosophers that define and discuss the connection between friendships and value 
describe friendships as intrinsically valuable, yet intrinsic value is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a relationship to be described as intimate.  Relationships that pass Moore’s test are 
intrinsically valuable but may still fail to be the final ends of those people involved in the 
relationships.  Thus, they would be unable to meet the defining criteria of intimate relationships.  
For example, Steve and Leonard might love, wish, and act for one another as means to some 
other end, such as their own increased pleasure when watching Mets games.  Even if such a 
relationship could be considered intrinsically valuable, it still could not be considered intimate 
because it is treated by Steve and Leonard as instrumentally good rather than as an end in itself.  
Conversely, a relationship that is extrinsically good could still be considered intimate.  The 
goodness of a particular relationship in which each of the people involved loved, wished, and 
acted for the other as an end might depend on circumstantial features of the relationship, yet this 
would not prevent the relationship from meeting the requirements of an intimate relationship.  
For example, even if the relationship between John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor was only good 
because it existed at that particular time in history and would have been bad had it existed in any 
other time period, the relationship could be considered an intimate one: as long as they loved, 
wished, and acted for one another as ends in themselves the relationship would still meet the 
relevant criteria. 
Conversely, how a relationship is valued does directly affect whether that relationship 
can be considered intimate.  Final goods are valued for their own sakes, as ends in themselves, 
rather than as means to some other goods.  A theory that does not allow for the possibility of 
relationships having final value cannot address the value of intimate relationships.  In order for 




as ends in themselves.  Thus, two people involved in a close interpersonal relationship must 
value one another as final goods for that relationship to meet the definition of an intimate 
relationship.
84
  The alternatives, not valuing one another at all or valuing one another only as 
instrumental goods, are psychologically incompatible with the existence of an intimate 
relationship.  One simply cannot feel strong positive emotions toward a person for his own sake 
without valuing that person.  Furthermore, strong positive emotions for a person as an end in 
himself are indicative of the value placed on that person as a final good.  Similarly, to love a 
person for himself is to value him as more than a means to some other end.  If Steve values his 
close friend Shivang merely as a way to further enjoy his trips to New York City, then Steve 
cannot be said to love Shivang for himself.
85
  There is an undeniable connection, then, between 
loving a person for himself and valuing that person as an end in himself: one must value a person 
as an end in himself, as a final good, in order for one to be able to love a person as an end in 
herself.
86
   
Badhwar in “Friends As Ends In Themselves” discusses a counterargument to the 
preceding claims: the possibility that the pleasure that comes from loving someone makes all 
love instrumental.  It seems undeniable that the experience of love comes with some amount of 
pleasure.  If this pleasure is the actual goal of love then it would be impossible to love anyone as 
an end in herself.  In this case, all lovers would be treating their loved ones as an instrumental 
means to the end of pleasure that comes from love.  This would then make it impossible for any 
relationship to meet the criteria of an intimate relationship.  Badhwar compares this argument to 
that of psychological egoists who would claim that everything is done for self-interested reasons.   
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Bishop Joseph Butler’s counter to the psychological egoist would also seem applicable in 
this situation: one cannot get pleasure from loving someone unless that person is genuinely the 
goal of the love.
87
  Despite her agreement with Butler’s argument, Badhwar pursues the issue 
further in order to see whether love is ultimately a means to the final good of happiness.
88
  She 
formulates two arguments against the claim that love must be instrumental.  First, she compares 
love to the instrumental good of seeing green valleys.
89
  She notes that the desire to obtain the 
instrumental good of seeing green valleys ends once the final good of happiness is attained.  Yet, 
this is not the case with love.  Love does not end after one is made happy.  In fact, it is often 
augmented.  The desire to see a green valley and the happiness that comes from the fulfillment of 
that desire can exist separately.  However, this is not the case with happiness and love.  Badhwar 
writes, 
Happiness is related to end love not as a goals to a means, but rather, as an element to a 
complex whole.  So when x is loved as an end, the happiness cannot, logically, exist apart 
from the love: different end loves bring different forms of happiness.  By contrast, when 
x is loved as a means, the happiness is a further goal of love, and can, logically, exist 
without it: different means loves can bring the same form of happiness.
90
 
Love and the pleasure and happiness that result from it are too closely bound to be separated into 
a traditional means-ends relationship. 
 Another question about intimate relationships is whether their value can be objective 
despite the subjectivity entailed by their defining criteria.  Two constituent features of intimate 
relationships are the emotions and desires of the individuals involved.  The relevant emotions 
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and desires are subjective, existing only in the minds of particular subjects, yet subjective 
psychological states may still be objectively valuable.  In other words, the value of the relevant 
psychological states may be a real part of the world separate from any other psychological states 
of the two subjects involved in the relationship and separate from the psychological states of any 
other subject.  If value supervened on psychological states, then some of these subjective states 
would be objectively valuable.  Thus, it is at least possible that subjective psychological states 
such as emotions and desires can be the bearers of objective value and there is no inherent 
conflict between the subjectivity of the psychological states necessary for intimate relationships’ 
existence and the objectivity of their value. 
 Intimate relationships are interpersonal relationships in which those people involved love 
one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so in a way that regards one another 
as an end in herself, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that the other loves and wishes 
one well as an end in herself.  These relationships may have intrinsic or extrinsic value, but that 
value must be a final value as opposed to an instrumental value.  The love for the other as an end 
in herself that is, by definition, a necessary component of intimate relationships is incompatible 
with valuing the relationship only as a means to some other end.  Furthermore, because the 
pleasure that results from an intimate relationship is inseparable from the relationship and does 
not end when either party is happy, intimate relationships are not all instrumental to the 
production of pleasure or happiness.  Finally, the subjectivity of the psychological states that 






Chapter 4: Kant and the Value of Intimate Relationships 
 Despite many criticisms that Kantian theory is inimical to the development and 
maintenance of intimate relationships, Kant did write about such relationships and consider them 
valuable.  Part one of this chapter will argue that Kant’s discussion of friendships treats them as 
extrinsic, final goods.  In part two of this chapter, Kantian friendships will be shown to be a 
subset of intimate relationships: they share all the defining characteristics of intimate 
relationships but add additional requirements that the relationships must meet to be considered 
Kantian friendships.  Part three will consider the criticisms of Bernard Williams, Michael 
Stocker, and Laurence Blum who all claim that Kant’s theory is problematic because of its 
treatment of intimate relationships.  Part four will evaluate Barbara Herman’s replies to these 
criticisms.
91
  Finally, part five of this chapter will explain why, despite Herman’s attempts, 
Kantianism still fails to account for the value of intimate relationships. It will also pinpoint the 
theoretical components of Kantianism from which the failure stems. 
Part I: Value in Kantian Friendships 
 Kant is clear in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, hereafter FM, that the 
good will is the only unqualifiedly good thing when he writes “Nothing in the world – indeed 
nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without 
qualification except a good will.”
92
  Despite this clarity two pertinent questions about the 
goodness of the good will are: what sort of value does Kant attribute to it and how does that 
value intersect with the value of actions. 
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Unqualified goodness is, for Kant, both an intrinsic and final value.  Fred Feldman argues 
that unqualified goodness, charitably conceived, means incorruptibly good.   He writes, “When a 
thing is [incorruptibly] good, it has a sort of goodness that things have of necessity. It continues 
to have just as much of this goodness in all possible worlds and in all possible circumstances.”
93
 
All other characteristics or objects, such as intelligence or money, are only good in certain 
conditions and therefore their value is corruptible.  For example, intelligence and money are 
good when possessed by a moral exemplar but can be quite bad in the hands of a vicious person.  
Conversely, the goodness of the Kantian good will is not changed by any circumstance or 
different in any possible world.  Kant’s claim that the good will is unqualifiedly good, then, 
amounts to a claim that the good will is intrinsically good in Moore’s sense.  As discussed in 
chapter two, something that has unqualified goodness also meets one of the conditions for 
intrinsic goodness: that the value remains the same under all possible circumstances.
94
  The value 
of the good will is positive and uninfluenced by anything external to it; in other words, its 
goodness is not located outside itself but is internal and therefore intrinsic in Moore’s sense.  For 
Kant, the value of the good will is also a final value.  He writes “The good will is not good 
because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed 
end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it is good of itself” (FM 10).  Kant here explains 
how the good will is valuable specifically pointing out that it is not instrumentally good but good 
as an end in itself, as a final value. 
 Though the good will is the only thing with unqualified goodness, actions that derive 
from the motive of duty also have moral worth: 
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[Thus the first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done 
from duty.]  The second proposition is: An action performed from duty does not have its 
moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which 
it is determined.  Its moral value, therefore, does not depend on the realization of the 
object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action is done, 
without any regard to the objects of the faculty of desire (FM 16). 
The same question asked about the value of the good will can be asked of morally worthy 
actions: what type of value do they possess?  According to Keith Simmons actions with moral 
worth are manifestations of the good will.
95
  Barbara Herman argues in The Practice of Moral 
Judgment, hereafter PMJ, that “The point of saying that it is actions that are credited with moral 
worth is to highlight the relationship between an action and its motive (via the action’s maxim), 
which is where moral worth resides…”
96
  Both Simmons and Herman locate the worth of the 
action outside the action itself; therefore, the moral goodness of actions is extrinsic.  The second 
question about the value of morally good actions is how they are valuable: as means or ends.  As 
evidenced by the previous quotation from FM the value of actions is final since an action’s 
goodness exists regardless of its outcome.  Thus, the action is not merely valuable because it 
leads to some morally valuable consequence.  Additionally, the action is not valuable because it 
makes the will good or better.  Herman writes of Kantian theory  
The number of morally worthy acts performed, however, is not proportional to the will’s 
goodness… Moral worth is an expression of good will in our actions. It is not a 
quantitative measure of good will… as A is prepared to act beneficently, he has a good 
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will.  It will not be improved if he acts, nor will it be diminished if… he refrains from 
action” (PMJ 35).   
The good will does make the action coming from it good, but the implication is only 
unidirectional.  The goodness of an action is not a means to some other end, but an end in itself.  
As a result, actions that constitute intimate relationships can have final extrinsic value. 
 Kant discusses friendship most extensively in two of his works: The Metaphysics of 
Morals, afterwards abbreviated MM, and the Lectures on Ethics, hereafter LE.
97
  In MM Kant 
writes that “striving for friendship… is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an 
honorable one” (MM 261).  Lara Denis expands on Kant’s point and argues that “Kant praises 
friendship because he understands it as a relationship that embodies love and respect for others, 
preserves self-respect, and fosters self-development.”
98
  In LE Kant claims that there are two 
motives to action for humans, self love and love of humanity (LE 200).  It is the second of these 
that Kant identifies as the moral motive and then associates with friendship (LE 202).  Stijn Van 
Impe writes that the idea of friendship according to Kant is “‘true’ and ‘necessary’, not from the 
natural point of view of what we will do, but from the moral point of view of what we ought to 
do.”
99
  Thus, Kant sees friendships as morally valuable relationships.  Since friendship is a duty 
set by reason, actions that initiate or perpetuate a Kantian friendship can be seen as extrinsically 
good, final ends. 
Part II: Kantian Friendships as Intimate Relationships 
Kantian friendships, however, may or may not meet the criteria of intimate relationships.  
Kant actually notes that there are several types of friendship in both MM and LE, but attributes 
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the previously discussed moral goodness to what he terms moral friendships (LE 203 and MM 
263).  An examination of moral friendships shows that they are a subset of intimate relationships 
since they involve love between those in the relationship, wishes and actions for the other’s 
good, the treatment of the other person as an end in herself, mutuality, and trust. 
Kant describes the sentiments involved in friendships in the Vigilantius notes of the 
Lectures on Ethics, hereafter referred to as V.
 100
  He speaks of the “sweet delight in the 
enjoyment of friendship.”  He also discusses the importance of well-liking and well-wishing as 
separable components of friendship (V 407).  He says “well-liking can never be wrung from us, 
by inclination, without an occasion; so it can never be commanded as a duty” (V 408).  Together 
these points show that according to Kant friends do feel pleasure when together and, therefore, 
satisfy the criterion of love for the other person that is a component of intimate relationships. 
Kant also writes that in the closest form of friendship friends wish and act for one 
another’s benefit: 
How one wishes for a friend in need (one who is, of course, an active friend, ready to 
help at his own expense)… friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage but 
must rather be a purely moral one, and the help that each may count on from the other in 
case of need must not be regarded as the end and determining ground of friendship – for 
in that case one would lose the other’s respect – but only as the outward manifestation of 
an inner heartfelt benevolence…”(MM 262). 
Kant here details a relationship that clearly addresses wishing and doing good for the other and 
references several additional criteria of intimate relationships.  For example, this quotation refers 
to the way in which friends act for one another as ends in themselves.  This account also 
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discusses the reciprocal nature of friendship.  Kant expands on this component of friendship 
when he writes, 
Well-wishing towards others is, however, more closely and strictly coupled with the idea 
of friendship, if the criterion of reciprocal well-wishing is attached to it; for in sensu lato, 
the expression to have true friendship for another is not necessarily associated with the 
idea that this other is also grateful in return, and harbours the same well-wishing towards 
ourself.  There can therefore be amor unilateralis; but strictly such well-wishing changes 
into friendship (amicitia) through a reciprocal love, or amor bilateralis” (V 408). 
Trust is also a component of the highest form of friendship according to Kant.  He 
defines this form of friendship in MM as “the complete confidence of two persons in revealing 
their secret judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with 
mutual respect” (MM 263).  This definition coincides with the trust criterion of intimate 
relationships.  Kant goes on to discuss the importance of this trust as a fulfillment of one’s need 
to disclose one’s thoughts to another: “We all have a strong impulse to disclose ourselves, and 
enter wholly into fellowship” (LE 206).  Yet, one can only do this if she is confident the 
disclosed information will not be used against her or be detrimental to the respect the other 
person has for her. Kant writes that someone without such a relationship, 
would like to discuss with someone what he thinks about his associates, the government, 
religion and so forth, but he cannot risk it: partly because the other person, while 
prudently keeping back his own judgments, might use this to harm him, and partly 
because, as regards disclosing his faults, the other person may conceal his own, so that he 





The major difference between Kant’s account of friendship and intimate relationships is 
Kant’s focus on equality (V 408 and MM 262).  This added criterion simply makes Kant’s 
definition of friendship more restrictive than the definition of intimate relationships; nonetheless, 
a Kantian friendship would still count as an intimate relationship because it meets all the criteria 
necessary for the relationship to be categorized as intimate.  Using Kant’s more restrictive term 
friendship as a proxy for intimate relationships has some important consequences.  If Kant can 
successfully account for the moral value he grants friendships, one might still criticize Kant for 
failing to account for the moral value of other sorts of intimate relationships.  On the other hand, 
if Kant cannot account for the moral value of friendships, relationships which he admits are 
morally valuable, then his theory falls short of justifying even his own claims about these 
relationships. 
Part III: Kant’s Critics 
 Williams, Stocker, and Blum each attempt to show that the theoretical constraints of 
Kant’s moral theory prevent thorough-going Kantians from actually having and valuing the sort 
of friendships about which Kant writes.  Herman sorts the various criticisms into three main 
objections: 1. Kantians must be more concerned with fulfilling duty than the objects of duty, 2. 
Kantians must disavow the emotions as morally valuable motives, 3. Kantians’ attachment to 
living according to the dictates of morality undermines their commitment to other people. 
 The first of these objections claims that the Kantian insistence on acting from the motive 
of duty precludes a real concern for the objects of action.  This would prove problematic for 
intimate relationships because people in intimate relationships are supposed to act for one 
another as ends.  For example, if one has a duty to teach one’s child philosophy, then a moral 




teaching of philosophy to one’s child nor one’s child herself is the direct end of the action but 
simply a means to acting morally: the goal of the action is to respect the moral law not to help 
the child.  Stocker and Blum both give examples that attempt to show the problematic 
relationship between moral motives and ethical ends.  Stocker explains how visiting someone in 
the hospital from the motive of duty does not indicate a concern for that person or her health as 
an end.
101
  He writes “When someone acts for the sake of goodness, the goodness is his goal.” 
102
  
He also argues in “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” that the motive of doing the 
right thing conflicts with the correct objects of those motives.  For example, Adam promises 
Ryan that he will help him study for a test.  The question is what Adam’s motive is for keeping 
the promise.  According to Stocker, the object of Adam’s motive is Ryan: Ryan is the person 
Adam is helping study.  However, Stocker believes that a Kantian’s motive must be “to do what 
is morally right” which makes no mention of Ryan whatsoever.  This makes some objects of 
morally good actions, such as intimate relationships, impossible.
103
  Blum contrasts the motives 
of two people helping a third.  He argues that the person motivated only by Kantian duty would 
not be concerned with the person being helped.  This reveals the unimportance of that person as 
an object of morally motivated action.
104
  Blum explicitly denies a Kantian connection between 
acting from a duty to benefit someone and acting for the end of that person or her benefit.
105
 
 The second objection facing Kantians is that they view the emotions as insufficient 
motives for moral action.  This implies that many of the emotions and desires that constitute 
intimate relationship do not have moral worth.  According to this characterization of Kant, an 
action motivated by an emotion, or anything other than duty, is not morally good.  He writes, 
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Thus, for instance, I should seek to further the happiness of others, not as though its 
realization was any concern of mine (whether because of direct inclination or of some 
satisfaction related to it indirectly through reason); I should do so merely because the 
maxim which excludes it from my duty cannot be comprehended as a universal law in 
one and the same volition (FM 60). 
This is seen by Williams and Blum as an impoverished view of morality generally and 
specifically the moral worth of actions.  Williams writes that certain actions have value precisely 
because they are “the product of an emotional response.”
106
  Blum’s entire book Friendship, 
Altruism and Morality offers an argument for the moral value of emotions.  He writes that 
The Kantian view of feelings and emotions and its view of morality constitute a powerful 
and influential tradition of thought, which would deny a substantial role to sympathy, 
compassion, and concern in morality and moral motivation.
107
 
Blum also offers a couple of reasons for Kantians’ dismissal of emotions as moral motives.
108
  
First, Kantians believe emotions are not reliable enough to motivate consistent, principled, moral 
action.  Acting on the dictates of rationality will always result in consistent action because 
rationality will not vary from one situation to another.  On the other hand, emotions are 
dependent on the circumstance and can lead to contradictory actions.  The circumstantial nature 
of emotions also makes universalizing them as a motive problematic, and for Kantians 
universalizing the maxim of an action ensures its impartiality. 
 The final objection against Kantianism is that its followers must alienate themselves from 
their interpersonal relationships to live a moral life.  In order to act morally Kantians must put 
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respect for the moral law above all other commitments.  According to Williams this sort of 
requirement is an attack on an individual’s integrity.  Williams writes that “impartial morality, if 
the conflict really does arise, must be required to win; and that cannot necessarily be a 
reasonable demand on the agent” because “there can come a point at which it is quite 
unreasonable for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of 
moral agents, something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that 
world at all.”
109
  A moral agent is required to make every other commitment in her life secondary 
to her commitment to the moral law.  To illustrate the problematic nature of this point Williams 
uses the example of a man who may save one person among many from drowning after a 
shipwreck.  The man’s wife is one of the people drowning.  According to Williams, a Kantian 
would be required to “check” the permissibility of saving his wife rather than someone else in 
order to be truly impartial.  Yet, this sort of “check” is at odds with the man’s commitment to his 
wife and could indicate a lack of appropriate concern for his relationship with her.  The man’s 
integrity is threatened because his Kantian leanings force him to violate his commitment to his 
wife by placing morality above that commitment; furthermore, the man’s devotion to his wife is 
a central part of his identity that he must question in the face of morality’s dictates. 
Part IV: A Kantian Response to Criticism 
 Herman attempts to respond to each of these three criticisms in PMJ.  She writes that the 
charge that Kantians are concerned only with respecting the moral law when they act rests on an 
incorrect assumption about the relationship between the motives and ends of actions.  Herman 
also seeks to clarify the role of emotions in moral action on a Kantian view in an attempt to 
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overcome the criticism that the emotions fail as moral motives.  Finally, Herman disagrees that 
one must be alienated from other people in order to live up to Kantian standards. 
 Herman argues that the motive for an action and the object of that action are not 
necessarily one in the same.  The object of an action is the end, or goal, of that action: what one 
is trying to accomplish by acting.  The motive for an action explains an agent’s reasons for 
choosing a particular end.  To return to a previous example, the goal of one’s action could be that 
one’s child learns philosophy.  This end might be motivated by several distinct desires: a desire 
to respect the moral law, a desire to discuss philosophy with one’s child, a desire to increase the 
child’s ability to reason critically, or even a desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship to college 
via the increase in the child’s standardized test scores that often accompanies the study of 
philosophy.  The same end, one’s child learning philosophy, may have multiple motivating 
desires.  Similarly, the objects of a single motive may change based on the circumstances 
accompanying the motive.  A desire for one’s child to earn a scholarship may lead to different 
objects of action depending on the child’s natural talents: if the child has superlative hand eye 
coordination but less than stellar test scores the object of this particular motive might be to have 
one’s child practice baseball rather than study philosophy.  Herman uses the example of promise 
keeping to make this point.  She writes, 
Consider a case of acting from the motive of duty according to the principle, “Keep the 
promises you make.”  (Call this principle P.) The motive of duty prompts me to act as 
morality (or P) requires: to do what is right.  What the motive of duty prompts me to do, 
then, is to keep my promise.  The object of my action in following P is to do whatever it 
is I promised to do.  I am moved to do this thing because P requires it; that is my reason 




or even “my kept promises.”  (I will not have made the world a morally better place if I 
make and keep more promises than I now have reason to do.) I am trying to do what I 
promised because I promised to do it: that is, I act from the motive of duty (PMJ 25-26). 
In fact, Herman describes an action motivated by duty with the object of conforming to duty 
“rule-fetishism” and contrasts it with acting dutifully (PMJ 27).  Of helping dutifully she writes, 
“Again, one does not help in order to satisfy a moral rule; the rule requires that you take the need 
of another as a reason to help” (PMJ 29).  To return to the example of Adam promising to help 
Ryan study, Herman argues that, as a Kantian, Adam’s object in keeping his promise would be to 
help Ryan study.  If instead Adam did not keep his promise with the object of helping Ryan, but 
simply because he is trying to keep all the promises he makes then he is missing the point of 
Kantian morality: that other people are ends in themselves.  On this account, a Kantian can be 
motivated by duty to act for the other in an intimate relationship and the resulting action will 
have moral worth:  Adam can be motivated by duty to act for Ryan’s sake when he keeps his 
promise and his action will have moral worth. 
 Herman examines the emotions’ role in Kantian moral motivation in an attempt to show 
that Kantians are not as opposed to the emotions’ involvement in moral actions as some of their 
critics suspect.  First, Herman addresses the notion that Kantians dismiss the emotions as moral 
motives because they are unreliable.  Herman argues that the real problem Kantians have with 
the emotions is not their unreliability in leading to moral action but their lack of connection to 
moral duty.  She writes, “Emotion-based motives fail to support the necessary internal 
connection between the motive and the rightness of a proposed action.  This is why Kant holds 
that maxims of action based on the motive of sympathy have no ‘moral content’” (PMJ 30).
110
  
Nevertheless, Herman admits that this position too is at odds with Williams’ critique of 
                                                 
110




Kantians: that they are unable to respond to others in ways that are appropriate given their 
interpersonal relationships.  Herman revises the objection: “The worry is that if the Kantian 
agent is required to act from the motive of duty, then when morality is at issue, his responses to 
others will be less personal, less an expression of his feeling for them” (PMJ 31).  She responds 
to this objection by noting that many actions that one would undertake for another are not 
matters of perfect duty; thus, in such cases the moral law is only a limiting condition (PMJ 31).  
Respect for the moral law, when acting as a limiting condition, is not a motive for action; 
therefore, emotions can be morally acceptable motivations for many of the actions that support 
intimate relationships.  Herman also argues that Kantians can be emotionally motivated to help 
others rather than being motivated out of a sense of duty to act beneficently.  She writes this 
despite the fact that the dutiful act would be morally valuable and the emotionally motivated act 
would not.  Her justification for this claim is that the good will’s value is unaffected by the 
number of acts to which it leads (PMJ 35).  A lost opportunity to act from the motive of duty is 
morally unimportant as long as the good will is ready to act should the emotional motivation 
prove insufficient to effect the morally called for action.  For example, imagine Jenn has a 
perfect duty to keep her promise not to cheat on Jared, but Jared would prefer that Jenn keep her 
promise out of a sense of love than a sense of duty.  Critics would argue that to be an upstanding 
Kantian Jenn would have to disappoint Jared and keep her promise out of a sense of duty rather 
than love.  Herman’s point is that Jenn does nothing immoral according to Kant if she keeps her 
promise out of a sense of love rather than a sense of duty because there is no moral imperative to 
maximize instantiations of the good will (PMJ 36). 
 This leads Herman to reject the third objection to Kantianism: that living a moral life 




commits to can tempt one toward immoral actions, but she disagrees that Kantianism necessarily 
alienates one from those commitments in a way that destroys one’s integrity.  Herman disputes 
these claims by focusing on morality’s role as a limiting condition and the possibility of one’s 
commitment to a moral life.  As previously discussed, the moral law’s role as a limiting 
condition enables a Kantian to be morally motivated by non-moral desires and act for non-moral 
ends in a wide range of cases.  Thus, one can be directly motivated by a desire to care for a 
friend or act for the good of one’s parent.  When there is no conflict between morality and one’s 
commitments, integrity is clearly not threatened.  Herman writes,  
For morality to respect the conditions of character (one’s integrity as a person), it must 
respect the agent’s attachments to his projects in a way that permits his actions to be an 
expression of those attachments.  Kantian morality, understood as a morality of limits, 
can do this (PMJ 39). 
However, Williams is also seriously concerned about cases in which the two do conflict.  
Herman deals with this concern by introducing the idea that some people commit themselves to 
living a moral life: 
[Williams’] sketch of the relations between the conditions of character and morality 
places morality outside the projects that give meaning to a life, even when the projects 
the agents identifies with have moral content.  But an attachment to impartial morality 
can itself be a project that gives a life meaning.  It is a defining feature of Kantian 
morality that one basic attachment, one self-defining project, is morality itself… As one 
can define oneself in part through a variety of impersonally described roles (American, 
feminist, university professor), so living a moral life can be partially constitutive of 




Even if Williams acknowledged this point, he might still argue that morality’s precedence over 
all other projects violates one’s integrity.  Herman disagrees.  Any two commitments may 
conflict at any time and an agent would be forced to choose between them.  Such occurrences are 
commonplace, yet they do not qualify as violations of integrity.  One may take morality to be a 
guiding and life-defining commitment without threatening her integrity.  Williams gives no 
reason to think that morality is a less appropriate commitment to guide one’s life than any other 
or that the choice to make an overriding commitment to something else is morally 
irreproachable.  For example, a parent’s overriding commitment to her child can lead her to act 
immorally toward other children despite the positive moral value of the relationship.  
Furthermore, a Kantian could criticize the overriding nature of the commitment to the child 
without condemning the commitment itself.  One can combine these points to offer a response to 
Williams’ example of a man saving his drowning wife.  First, it should now be clear that the man 
can be motivated by his love for his wife to act for her sake in saving her.  Second, while 
Kantianism is a limiting condition even in this case its role as such does not alienate the man 
from his wife or violate his integrity.  Herman writes “What the Kantian requires is only that he 
not view his desire to save his wife as an unconditionally valid reason.  This does not stand in the 
way of the direct expression of attachments in action” and adds in a footnote “We do not want to 
forget that a normal moral agent knows things: he does not have to figure out whether it is 
permissible to save his wife.  He knows it is, and that partly explains why he can act 
spontaneously, from feeling, and yet according to principle” (PMJ 42).  This is made even 
clearer when Williams’ example is changed so that the man must do something immoral in order 




In this modified example there is no clearly inappropriate violation of his integrity or his 
commitment to his wife when the man consults morality before deciding whether to save her. 
Part V: Kantian Friendships Are Morally Permissible But Not Valuable 
 Herman’s responses to Kant’s critics successfully show that Kantians can have intimate 
relationships, but these relationships do not have moral value.  It is morally permissible for 
Kantians to love other people.  Herman’s discussion of the emotions’ role in Kantian ethics 
shows that emotions such as love are not morally problematic as long as they are constrained by 
the dictates of the moral law.  The Kantian moral prohibition against actions that violate the 
moral law is not a moral imperative that all actions that can be motivated by duty must be 
motivated by duty.  Thus, it is morally permissible to be motivated by love to act for the other in 
an intimate relationship even in cases where the action motivated by love is a perfect duty.  
Moreover, this allows one to be sufficiently committed to one’s friends and does not necessarily 
alienate one from one’s friends.  However, neither these permitted actions nor the emotions that 
motivate them have moral worth.  Herman is quite clear that according to Kant’s moral theory 
emotions such as care and love are morally permissible motives, but they cannot give rise to 
morally valuable actions: 
Let us first survey the kind of room that Kantian ethics provides for actions motivated by 
care and concern for the other – what I will call “motives of connection.” … But 
permitting action from motives of connection does not fully resolve the problem.  Even 
though there is nothing wrong with acting from a motive of connection in circumstances 
of obligation, the Kantian is likely to insist that action so motivated has no moral worth.  
The Kantian position is that the value signaled by moral worth is action done from a 




with moral content.  A dutiful action done from a motive of connection has a maxim with 
a different content (PMJ 186). 
This forces her to question whether the value of relationships is moral (PMJ 187).  Despite her 
best efforts to show that morality and relationships are not necessarily at odds with one another, 
she never explains how actions that derive from motives of connection can be considered 
morally valuable.  Moral value and the value of intimate relationships must be seen as distinct on 
Kant’s view.  Therefore, one of the necessary constituents of intimate relationships, love for 
another, does not have moral value.  Kant claims that friendships, a type of intimate relationship, 
are morally valuable, but his system of ethics cannot account for that value.  This conflict stems 
from Kantianism’s inability to regard actions that result from any motive besides respect for the 
moral law as morally valuable. 
 Kant does find moral value in well-wishing toward others and acting for others as ends in 
themselves.  In V, Kant describes well-wishing as a duty: “For well-wishing to others is the 
universal duty of love, which we owe to every man, since we must absolutely make it our maxim 
to promote goodness in others” (V 408). Furthermore, the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative obligates one to treat everyone as an end in himself or herself: “Act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a 
means only” (FM 47).  These components of friendship, then, are not merely permissible but 
morally valuable according to Kant.  Yet, according to Kant these are duties each person owes to 
every other person, when possible, not just friends.  These duties are, in fact, fulfilled through 
intimate relationships and countless other relationships.  Therefore, the moral goodness Kantians 
can impart to intimate relationships according to the fulfillment of these duties is no different 




Kant the mutuality of a relationship does count towards the relationship’s status as a friendship, 
but the mutuality of the well wishing or treatment of the other as an end in herself cannot add to 
the goodness or moral worth of an action on his theory (V 408 and MM 263). 
 Baier, in her article “Trust and Antitrust,” further criticizes Kant, and others, for focusing 
an account of trust on the trust that exists between equals.  She writes, “But a complete moral 
philosophy would tell us how and why we should act and feel toward others in relationships of 
shifting and varying power asymmetry and shifting and varying intimacy.”  Kant does spend 
time in V endorsing the existence of trust between friends as being central to the relationship and 
grounded in the dual obligations of love and respect (V 408).  Nevertheless, Baier’s criticism is 
still applicable because Kantian friendships must exist between equals.  Though applicable, 
Baier’s criticism is an unnecessary addition for the purposes of this dissertation.  Her criticism 
would be more important to this project if Kant could account for the moral value of friendships: 
it would then serve as a critique of his inability to accurately depict the moral intricacies of other 
intimate relationships.  However, since Kant cannot sufficiently account for the moral value of 
relationships without imbalances in power and with relatively stable intimacy, such as 
friendships, and does discuss the moral importance of trust between equals, Baier’s critique is 
not needed to show that Kant’s account of the moral value of intimate relationships is 
problematic. 
 According to Kant, actions are extrinsic final goods that are morally valuable.  
Combinations of these actions could comprise morally valuable Kantian friendships, 
relationships which Kant himself deems morally good.  It is morally permissible for Kantians to 
have friendships in which the friends love one another.  Friends who wish each other well, treat 




However, these same actions initiated by casual acquaintances have the same moral worth.  
When a Kantian acts from a motive of love, care, or concern for a friend the action has no moral 
worth.  This is problematic because, though Kant includes inclinations such as well-liking as an 
important part of friendships, these necessary conditions of intimate relationships have no moral 
value on his view.  Therefore, a Kantian is left unable to account for the moral value of 
friendships.  While some of the actions that partially constitute friendships may be morally 
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Chapter 5: Moore and the Consequentialist Value of Intimate Relationships 
 Consequentialist arguments for the value of intimate relationships might at first seem 
simple and straightforward: intimate relationships, on the whole, lead to more good 
consequences than bad ones.  This is an empirical claim and few philosophers are willing to 
argue that intimate relationships lack instrumental value.  However, the questions that have given 
rise to more controversy are 1. whether consequentialist obligations allow for the cultivation of 
intimate relationships and 2. whether consequentialists can account for final value in 
interpersonal relationships in a way that is compatible with the definition of intimate 
relationships such as close friendships.  An interpersonal relationship may be instrumentally 
good and worthy of cultivation according to consequentialist views, but interpersonal 
relationships that lack final value according to the normative framework of consequentialism will 
not qualify as intimate relationships.
112
 
 G.E. Moore’s account of normative ethics is an important test case for consequentialism’s 
ability to capture the final value of intimate relationships because Moore, more clearly and 
specifically than other consequentialists, defines friendship and sets friendships up as one of the 
goods to be maximized. In one of Moore’s early papers, “Achilles or Patroclus?,”abbreviated AP 
from this point on, he analyses friendship.  He identifies it with love and explains the importance 
of loving and acting for others.
113
  In chapter six of the Principia Ethica, hereafter PE, Moore 
discusses the value of human intercourse stating:  
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By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of 
consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse 
and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.  No one, probably, who has asked himself the 
question, has ever doubted that personal affection and the appreciation of what is 
beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves; nor, if we consider strictly what things 
are worth having purely for their own sakes, does it appear probable that any one will 
think that everything else has nearly so great a value as the things which are included 
under these two heads.
114
  
Moore treats the pleasures of human intercourse, which he also calls personal affection, as one of 
many intrinsic goods.  His description of personal affection in PE connects to his explanation of 
love in AP.
 115
  The aforementioned axiology, in conjunction with his expression of a 
consequentialist normative theory in chapter five of the PE, leads to a pluralistic form of 
consequentialism that holds friendships as one of the goods to be maximized (PE 149). 
 Part one of this chapter will detail Moore’s account of friendship and show that Moorean 
friendships qualify as intimate relationships and that Moore considered those relationships to be 
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valuable.  In part two, the views of those who criticize consequentialism on the basis of its 
inability to account for intimate relationships will be examined.  Part three will evaluate potential 
responses to the problems posed in part two.  Finally, part four will see which of the problems 
identified in part two persist and what piece of Moorean consequentialism’s structure is at the 
root of its inability to acknowledge the value of intimate relationships. 
Part I: Moorean Friendships 
 Moore details the requirements of a loving friendship in AP, in so doing he explains 
interpersonal relationships that are quite similar to intimate relationships: both involve people 
loving one another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that 
regards one another as an end, doing so mutually or for one another, and trusting that the other 
loves and wishes one well as an end.   He later explains the value inherent in such relationships. 
 Moore writes that the passion of friendship is the permanent emotion he terms love (AP 
3).  He then goes on to list the identifying features of this passion.  Moore explains that the desire 
to see another person again is one of the first indicators of a developing friendship (AP 4).  This 
desire becomes an attraction to the other person.  Moore writes “We are attracted not only by his 
face, his voice, his manner, but also by his understanding, his morals, his feelings” (AP 4).  The 
desire and attraction lead to enjoyment whenever in the other’s presence: “…whether talking or 
silent we shall shew that his presence gives us delight” (AP 4).  This coincides with the 
explanation of love that is part of an intimate relationship’s definition.  Moore also writes 
“Lastly, we shall always prefer his good to our own; we shall always be trying to give him 
pleasure; and, if need be, shall be eager to die for him” (AP 5).  This indicates that a Moorean 
friend wishes well and acts for his friend’s good.  Moore does not specify that one does this for 




make the conclusion more likely especially when coupled with Moore’s claims in the PE that 
one’s friend is intrinsically valuable (PE 203).  Moore addresses the necessity of mutuality to his 
concept of friendship when he writes: 
I have been describing friendship throughout on the understanding that it is mutual 
between the two friends. If it be not, and one have a very strong passion for the other, 
which is not at all or but little returned; then that man is as far the most miserable of men, 
as he, whose love is returned, is the happiest. Such a passion, it seems to me, can never 
really be as strong, as one that is satisfied: for it shews that there is something in the 
object of love not perfectly sympathetic; his want of love for us, at all events, we cannot 
love: therefore our love is not perfect (AP 5).
116
 
Finally, while Moore does not explicitly discuss trust between friends, he does write that 
“From him we shall have no secrets at all; all that concerns him will be interesting to us; 
and we shall not scruple to speak to him plainly, what we think, of all those persons and 
things which may seem to affect him most nearly; it will be impossible for us to wound 
his prejudice or his pride” (AP 5). 
The secrets and open discussions Moore here discusses fit with Annette Baier’s claim that 
“Trust, on the analysis I have proposed, is letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as 
firms, nations, etc.) take care of something the truster cares about, where such "caring for" 
involves some exercise of discretionary powers.”
117
  Moore indicates that friends allow each 
other to take care of secrets, thus he implies that trust too is a vital part of friendships.  Moore’s 
account addresses each component of an intimate relationship: the love one feels for the other, 
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the wishes and actions for the other’s good, the treatment of the other person as an end-in-
himself, and the mutuality and trust involved in the relationships.  Though Moore’s account uses 
the word “friendship,” his analysis of friendship meets all the requirements of an intimate 
relationship’s definition as established in the second chapter.  Thus, Moorean friendships count 
as intimate relationships.  In fact, Moore is also open to the possibility of friendships existing 
between two people who are unequal.  The premise of AP is to explain how Achilles and 
Patroclus can be perfect friends despite Achilles’ clear superiority (AP 1).  Moorean friendships 
and intimate relationships are the same things.
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Moore clearly considers friendships valuable as one of his goals in AP was to “… prove 
friendship so immensely valuable…”(AP 1).  By the time he wrote PE he considered personal 
affection to be one of two ideal goods: goods that are highly valuable as ends in themselves (PE 
184, 188-189).  On Moore’s view personal affection is a highly complex organic unity made up 
of the relationships between states of consciousness and the persons in which they exist and to 
which they pertain (PE 189).  Personal affection is a highly valuable intrinsic good because, like 
aesthetic appreciation, it is an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an 
object’s beauty as well as true belief about the existence of the object and its beautiful qualities.  
The emotional response is what links Moore’s account of intrinsic good in PE to his account of 
friendship in AP.  Moore defines friendship as the permanent emotion of love in AP, so 
friendship can be an appropriate emotional response to the cognitive recognition of an object’s 
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beauty.  In other words, friendship is one form of personal affection.  When personal affection is 
good, and Moore is clear that it is not always so, the love one feels for one’s friend is an 
appropriate response to one’s accurate understanding of the friend’s beautiful character and true 
belief about the friend’s existence (PE 203).  Furthermore, the friend is intrinsically valuable to a 
high degree (PE 203).
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In chapter five of PE Moore explains how valuable unities fit into his larger 
consequentialist theory.  In a statement of the classic consequentialist normative structure Moore 
writes:  
“Our ‘duty,’ therefore, can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to 
exist in the Universe than any possible alternative.  And what is ‘right’ or ‘morally 
permissible’ only differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible 
alternative.  When, therefore, Ethics presumes to assert that certain ways of acting are 
‘duties’ it presumes to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest 
possible sum of good” (PE 148). 
The rightness of an action is determined by the good it causes.  Moore argues throughout PE that 
good cannot be analyzed down to some natural property but is a property in its own right (PE 
chapters 2-4).  This goodness, which he does not distinguish as being either moral or non-moral, 
can be possessed by different organic unities (PE 188-189).  As previously stated, personal 
affection is one such unity.  Thus, it is one’s duty to produce sums of good that include, but are 
not limited to, the friendships he describes. 
Part II: Consequentialism’s Critics 
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 Many philosophers have criticized consequentialists’ ability to account for the value of 
close interpersonal relationships like friendships.  Moore is able to avoid some of these criticisms 
simply by advocating a form of consequentialism that identifies the good with more than one 
object.  Thus, criticisms that target only a standard utilitarian system that sets up pleasure or 
happiness as the singular good to be maximized and therefore must admit that interpersonal 
relationships are always instrumental will not be addressed.  The criticisms that remain can be 
divided into two subcategories: those that target the consequentialist agent and those that 
criticize the theoretical framework of consequentialism.
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 The two most frequent criticisms of moral agents attempting to live by a consequentialist 
system of ethics are that such agents, when motivated directly by their friends or family, cannot 
be acting morally and that such agents become alienated from their friends and family.  Both 
criticisms are also leveled against Kantian moral agents as discussed in the preceding chapter.
121
  
Michael Stocker specifically targets Moore’s version of consequentialism for separating reason 
and motive when he writes: 
The problem is not simply that pleasure is taken to be the only good, the only right-
making feature. To see this, consider G. E. Moore's formalistic utilitarianism, which tells 
us to maximize goodness, without claiming to have identified all the goods. If, as I would 
have it and as Moore agrees, love relations and the like are goods, how could there be any 
disharmony here? Would it not be possible to embody Moore's justifying reason as a 
motive and still love? I do not think so. First, if you try to carry on the relationship for the 
sake of goodness, there is no essential commitment even to that activity, much less to the 
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persons involved. So far as goodness is involved, you might as well love as ski or write 
poetry or eat a nice meal or …. Perhaps it would be replied that there is something special 
about that good, the good of love treating it now not qua good but qua what is good or 
qua this good. In such a case, however, there is again an impersonality so far as the 
individuals are concerned. Any other person who would elicit as much of this good 
would be as proper an object of love as the beloved. To this it might be replied that it is 
that good which is to be sought with emphasis on the personal and individual features, the 
features that bind these people together. But now it is not clear in what sense goodness is 
being sought, nor that the theory is still telling us to maximize goodness. True, the theory 
tells us to bring about this good, but now we cannot separate what is good, the love, from 




If Stocker is right, then a thoroughgoing consequentialist will be unable to morally love another 
as an end in himself and be unable to have intimate relationships.
123
 
Moreover, according to Bernard Williams a consequentialist moral agent becomes 
alienated from his friends and family when abiding by an overriding commitment to an 
impersonal moral theory, whether Kantian or consequentialist, interferes with personal 
commitments to one’s friends and family.  In “A Critique of Utilitarianism” Williams attributes 
this flaw to the strength of negative responsibility in consequentialism and writes: 
For, to take the extreme sort of case, how can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard 
as one satisfaction among others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which 
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he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal 
scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?
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In Moore’s case one could replace “satisfaction” with “good” or even be more specific and 
replace it with “object of personal affection.”   In either case the force of Williams’ question 
remains: a commitment to Moore’s consequentialism seems to undermine one’s commitment to 
one’s intimate relationships. 
 In Neera Badhwar’s article “Why It Is Wrong to Always Be Guided By the Best,” she 
deals with several objections to consequentialist accounts of friendship including those just 
discussed.  However, rather than merely focusing on the problems a consequentialist agent has 
being a good friend she traces those problems back to the structure of consequentialism.  She 
discusses two features of consequentialist theories that make their valuation of intimate 
relationships problematic.  First, the goods that are to be maximized are not moral goods.  
Second, the goods that are to be maximized are not final goods. 
 Badhwar explains that the right and the good, the normative structure and axiology, of 
consequentialism are completely separate from one another.  The normative structure of 
consequentialism explains the moral obligation to maximize good in the world.  It does not 
address or define the good.  That is left to the axiology of the theory.  For example, the 
normative structure of Moore’s, John Stewart Mill’s, and Bentham’s accounts of 
consequentialism are basically the same.  What differentiate the three theories are their differing 
axiologies: or definitions of the good.  This complete separation, according to Badhwar, is one of 
the reasons that consequentialism cannot account for the value of friendships.  She writes, “The 
heart of the problem, as I see it, lies in the very idea of morality (the right, the justified) as a 
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means to an independent nonmoral good rather than as partly constitutive of the good 
(teleology)…”
125
  She expands on this point in a footnote stating  
… there is an occasional tendency to refer to the intrinsic good to be maximized as a 
moral good. But the word ‘moral’ here merely signifies that morality is concerned with 
maximizing goodness and not that there are different kinds of good, namely, the moral, 
the immoral, and the nonmoral.  This being the case, the use of the word ‘moral’ to 
qualify “good” is at best redundant, and at worst misleading, since it blurs the contrast 
with theories that do distinguish among moral, immoral, and nonmoral goods.
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Badhwar is arguing that the complete separation of normative structure from axiology employed 
by consequentialism prevents the consequentialist from categorizing any set of goods as 
particularly moral.  Thus, even Moore’s theory that explicitly states personal affection and its 
objects, such as friendships, are good cannot accurately term them “morally good” since the 
consequentialist axiology has no direct connection to its normative framework, the one piece of 
the theory that is particularly moral.  So according to Badhwar, it is impossible to assign moral 
value to friendships on a consequentialist theory such as Moore’s. 
 Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism is that it requires an instrumental 
justification for friendship.
127
  Moore is clear about the intrinsic value of personal affection, but 
the structure of consequentialism requires that each intrinsically valuable object’s existence be 
justified by its place in the whole.  In other words, despite the goodness of friendships being 
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 Throughout the article Badhwar contrasts instrumental value/justification with intrinsic value.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, this comparison is misleading.  Badhwar concludes that friendships cannot have intrinsic value according 
to consequentialism.  However, in the terms set out in chapter 2 (also see footnote 112), her premises lead to the 
conclusion that friendships cannot have final value according to consequentialism.  They do not effectively conclude 
that friendships cannot have intrinsic value.  In light of this fact and for clarity’s sake, the rest of my discussion of 
Badhwar’s argument will explain it as if she is arguing toward the conclusion that friendships cannot have final 




located in the friendships themselves, consequentialism still requires that their value be appraised 
in relation to their place in the maximally good state of affairs.  Badhwar writes: 
For the problematic feature of [consequentialism] is not that it sometimes calls for a 
renunciation of friendship on account of its consequences but that it sees the moral worth 
of friendship as entirely dependent on its total consequences, with no independent moral 
weight assigned to its worth for the individuals involved.  However, within a moral 
theory that regards friendship as moral in its own right… the fact that a certain friendship 
is promoting net disvalue… does not entail that the friendship is unjustified.
128
 
Badhwar believes consequentialism is unable to account for the final value of friendships; 
furthermore, Badhwar argues that friendships are justified by themselves, not their relationship to 
a state of affairs with the most goodness in it.  However, according to Moore’s consequentialism 
even the ideal goodness of personal affection is not an end-in-itself.  It is a means to the final 
good: the state of affairs in which good has been maximized.  Badhwar explains, “The problem 
confronting [consequentialism] might be summarized thus: consequentialist teleology defines 
intrinsic value in morally neutral terms and morality as a means to [final] value.”
129
 
Part III: Consequentialist Responses 
Moore, himself, did not respond to these criticisms; however, later consequentialists with 
normative views similar to Moore’s have responded to the charges leveled against their theories.  
Peter Railton in “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality” (abbreviated ACD 
from this point on) argues that an objective form of pluralistic consequentialism, similar to 
Moore’s, can overcome Stocker’s and Williams’ critiques.
130
  Additionally, when Moore’s 
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axiology is compared to Kant’s it becomes clear that Moore’s desire not to qualify goodness is 
not a problem for consequentialism’s appraisal of friendships as Badhwar claims. 
 Railton agrees that Stocker’s and Williams’ points, if accurate, would be problematic for 
any moral theory to which they apply.  He writes 
 First, we must somehow give an account of practical reasoning that does not merely 
multiply points of view and divide the self - a more unified account is needed. Second, 
we must recognize that loving relationships, friendships, group loyalties, and spontaneous 
actions are among the most important contributors to whatever it is that makes life 
worthwhile; any moral theory deserving serious consideration must itself give them 
serious consideration (ACD 139).   
Railton also admits that certain forms of consequentialism are subject to the problems that 
Stocker and Williams identify:  
One mistake of dominant consequentialist theories, I believe, is their failure to see that 
things other than subjective states can have intrinsic value.  Allied to this is a tendency to 
reduce all intrinsic values to one – happiness.  Both of these features of classical 
utilitarianism reflect forms of alienation (ACD 148). 
However, Moore’s consequentialism has neither of these features and Railton proposes a 
pluralistic version of consequentialism that is reminiscent of Moore’s (ACD 149,152).  On this 
view, Railton believes that one can avoid the pitfalls described by Stocker.  Railton writes: 
It becomes a complex matter to describe the psychology of intrinsic value. For example, 
should we say that one values a relationship of solidarity, say, a friendship, because it is a 
friendship? That makes it sound as if it were somehow instrumental to the realization of 




is itself the valued thing, the thing of a valued kind. Of course, one can say that one 
values friendship and therefore seeks friends, just as one can say one values happiness 
and therefore seeks happy experiences. But this locution must be contrasted with what is 
being said when, for example, one talks of seeking things that make one happy. Friends 
are not "things that make one achieve friendship” they partially constitute friendships, 
just as particular happy experience partially constitute happiness for an individual. Thus 
taking friendship as an intrinsic value does not entail viewing particular friendships 
instrumentally (ACD 149-150 in a footnote).
131 
Railton couples the above point with a description of a sophisticated consequentialist agent that 
is able to avoid Stocker’s concerns.  A sophisticated consequentialist is one who strives to lead 
an objectively consequentialist life even at the cost of using non-consequentialist decision 
making procedures (ACD 153).
132
  For example, if Shivang is a sophisticated consequentialist 
that recognizes friendships as one of the intrinsically good things in the world to be maximized, 
then he will strive to make friends.  A consequentialist decision making procedure, however, 
would likely hinder Shivang’s ability to make friends by turning his focus to efficiency and 
speed in the development of a friendship rather than on the person with whom he is building a 
relationship.  After all, questions about another’s efficiency at friend-making are more likely to 
send a potential friend running in the other direction than to open him up for conversation.  Then, 
it is only by focusing on the other person in non-consequentialist ways that Shivang can fulfill 
the consequentialist maxim of creating more good by building friendships, and this is not 
problematic for the sophisticated consequentialist that Railton describes.  Elinor Mason even 
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argues that one can be motivated directly by the other person in an intimate relationship without 
contradicting background consequentialist motives.
133
  She does this by using a consequentialist 
standard to evaluate the dispositions that an agent should cultivate.  Mason claims that such a 
standard would dictate that consequentialists develop dispositions to act out of concern for others 
so long as friendship in general is consequentially worth pursuing.  Once this disposition takes 
hold and there is genuine concern for others, acting from that concern need not raise 
consequentialist objections since the disposition was approved through consequentialist 
justification and there is no new reason to doubt that justification.
134
  Railton gives several of his 
own examples to show that a doing a consequentialist calculus may prevent an agent from 
maximizing the good; therefore, in order to increase one’s chances of maximizing the good, one 
can often use non-consequentialist reasoning.
135
  This can be applied to one’s interactions with 
the other in an intimate relationship: one should not, according to consequentialism’s normative 
structure, constantly calculate how to maximize the good when dealing with one’s intimate 
relationships if doing so will harm or destroy those relationships (ACD 154).  One can be 
committed to the others in an intimate relationship as ends rather than means to abstract good 
since doing so will in fact be the only way to maximize the abstract good on consequentialist 
theories like Moore’s.  Additionally, one need not ask oneself whether one’s particular intimate 
relationships are the maximally good ones at every moment.  Even when the relationships are 
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maximally good, questioning the relationship will threaten to destroy that good, for example, by 
destroying the trust that exists between those in an intimate relationship.  At the same time, there 
is still room for normative reflection on one’s intimate relationships, in terms of the good they 
create or destroy, in case they are leading one to grossly immoral acts (ACD 151).   
This leads into Williams’ objection that the negative responsibility entailed by 
consequentialism alienates practicing consequentialists from their relationships.  The negative 
responsibility entailed by even Railton’s version of consequentialism could force one to give up 
or violate one’s intimate relationships.  According to Williams, the realization that 
consequentialism will sometimes clearly obligate an agent to choose some action over one’s 
relationship alienates that agent from the other person in the relationship.
136
  Against this view 
Railton argues that even such deeply held commitments as those made to intimate relationships 
must, at some point, be morally evaluated in order to preserve one’s ability to make autonomous 
decisions.
137
  Additionally, Railton points out the inevitability of conflict between any two 
deeply held commitments: 
It might be objected that one cannot really regard a person or a project as an end as such 
if one’s commitment is in this way contingent or overridable.  But were this so, we would 
be able to have very few commitments to ends as such.  For example, one could not be 
committed to both one’s spouse and one’s child as ends as such, since at most one of 
these commitments could be overriding in cases of conflict.  It is easy to confuse the 
notion of commitment to an end as such (or for its own sake) with that of an overriding 
commitment, but strength is not the same as structure.  To be committed to an end as 
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such is a matter of (among other things) whether it furnishes one with reasons for acting 
that are not mediated by other concerns (ACD 141-142).
138
 
For example, one may have a sophisticated consequentialist commitment to both one’s child and 
one’s spouse and not necessarily be alienated from either relationship, even in cases when one 
commitment must override the other.  For example, choosing to console one’s child rather than 
one’s spouse when both are upset need not alienate one from one’s spouse.  Additionally, as 
Herman noted in her defense of Kant, morality itself can be one of these deeply held 
commitments, it too can override other commitments without causing any more alienation than 
the previous example.
139
  Therefore, the sophisticated consequentialist who chooses to fulfill his 
obligation to save one million lives by sacrificing the life of his spouse, thereby showing a 
commitment to consequentialism over a commitment to his spouse, is not necessarily alienated 
from his spouse or other loved ones.
140
  Railton’s point is that it is normal for commitments to 
conflict.  When the commitment to a particular morality causes a conflict, that conflict is not 
significantly different from the conflict caused by the commitment to two different people.  
Williams’ argument fails as a criticism of a consequentialist theory’s ability to value intimate 
relationships. 
 Moore not only addressed Badhwar’s claim that the value that a consequentialist theory 
seeks to maximize is not specifically moral, he embraced it.  Moore made a point of explaining 
good as its own unanalyzable non-natural property in PE (PE 8-10).  Goodness was not divided 
up into different subcategories like moral and nonmoral.  There was only one normative concept 
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according to Moore: general goodness.  Therefore, friendships are not morally good, but simply 
good.   
Kantian ethics is also unable to account for the moral goodness of intimate 
relationships.
141
  This forced Herman to wonder whether friendships had a different, nonmoral, 
sort of goodness.
142
  On this basis the Kantian account of intimate relationships’ goodness was 
found deficient.
143
   
It would seem that Moore’s consequentialist account of intimate relationships’ goodness 
would be unacceptable for the same reason.  However, this is not the case.  The Kantian account 
is problematic because by failing to assign moral goodness to intimate relationships it relegates 
any goodness they possess to the realm of nonmoral goodness.  Whatever this type of goodness 
is, it must be different from moral goodness and could potentially conflict with it.  A Moorean 
consequentialist account fails to assign moral goodness to intimate relationships because for 
Moore no such separable goodness exists: there is only general goodness.  Moore’s discussion of 
goodness in chapters two through four of PE is an attempt to establish the unanalyzable nature of 
goodness.  Subsequently, he asserts in chapter six that personal affection is good in this 
unanalyzable way.  Thus, on Moore’s view intimate relationships do possess this single version 
of goodness.  Furthermore, this goodness does not conflict with morality; it guides moral action.  
Morality obligates people to maximize goodness, so goodness and intrinsically good objects 
guide right action (PE 148).  While intimate relationships are not morally good according to 
Moore because nothing is morally good, they are still good generally and so must be taken into 
account when acting morally: they are one sort of intrinsically good object that can contribute to 
the maximally good state of affairs.  They are also at least as relevant to morality as any other 
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good.  In fact, Moore’s claims about the magnitude of intimate relationships’ goodness would 
seem to make them more relevant to morality than many other goods: Moore’s consequentialist 
normative framework emphasizes maximizing good and the large quantity of goodness of 
intimate relationships will often outweigh other objects that are less good (PE 188-189).  
Morality is concerned with the good of intimate relationships according to Moore’s 
consequentialism, but the same cannot be said of Kant’s theory. 
Part IV: Moorean Relationships Are Intrinsically Valuable But Not Final Goods 
 Badhwar’s second objection to consequentialism also targets a piece of 
consequentialism’s theoretical framework that Moore explicitly endorses.  Moore is clear that 
moral rightness is associated not with individual intrinsically good objects but with maximally 
good states of affairs (PE 148).  This means that, on Moore’s account of morality, states of 
affairs are final goods; intrinsically good objects such as friendships are not.  A final good is 
something valued for its own sake.
144
  Yet, intrinsic goods are not valued for their own sake 
according to Moore’s theory.  They are instead valued for their place in a maximally good state 
of affairs.  A friendship may contain its value in itself and therefore meet Moore’s criteria for 
intrinsic goodness; nevertheless, the friendship’s place, or lack thereof, in a maximally good state 
of affairs is still paramount according to the theoretical framework of consequentialism.  The 
very same logic shows that friends cannot be assigned final value either according to 
consequentialism’s normative structure: the friend is not the goal of consequentialist action but a 
means to producing a maximally good state of affairs.  The intrinsic goods of Moore’s theory are 
only instrumentally good since their value relies on their connection to the final good: the 
maximally good state of affairs.  This may not be troublesome when accounting for the value of 
intrinsic goods such as beauty which need not be a final value, but this is a serious problem for 
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friendships.  As discussed in chapter three, friends cannot be valued as only instrumental goods.  
Friends who are not valued as final goods are not in an intimate relationship with one another 
because the friends are numerically replaceable, do not value one another and/or relationship 
directly, and do not make the other the object of concern in the relationship.  If, in Badhwar’s 
terms, a relationship must rely on its place in the maximally good state of affairs for its 
justification, then interpersonal relationships cannot be valued as ends in themselves.  Therefore, 
they are not intimate relationships.
145
 
 This creates a conflict between Moore’s account of morality and his account of 
friendship.  Friendships are supposed to be one of the most valuable organic unities that exist, 
but his consequentialist view is unable to register the final value of the relationships that he 
deems so valuable.  In failing to register the final value of interpersonal relationships, 
consequentialism belies its inability to recognize intimate relationships.  The theory is only able 
to assign instrumental value to interpersonal relationships, so no interpersonal relationship could 
ever meet the definition of intimate relationship on Moore’s view.   
Moore is able to claim that friendships have intrinsic value based on intuition (PE 188-
189).  His axiology, itself, does not present a problem for intimate relationships.  However, once 
this axiology is combined with the normative structure of consequentialism the resulting moral 
theory is incapable of according final value to any of the intrinsic goods recognized by his 
axiology.  All the intrinsic goods are valuable as means to the creation of a state of affairs in 
which the good has been maximized.  Particular intimate relationships may or may not be 
constitutive of this final good.
146
  When a relationship is not part of the maximally good state of 
affairs it may be intrinsically good but is certainly not finally good.  Intimate relationships such 
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as friendships require that particular people in interpersonal relationships be final goods, or ends 
in themselves.  An interpersonal relationship may not be good.  The goodness of an interpersonal 
relationship may be superseded by some other final good forcing someone who wants to fulfill 
his moral obligation to choose the other final good over the relationship.  In either case, the 
relationship could still meet the definition of an intimate relationship.  Yet, a normative theory 
that appraises the value of the other in an interpersonal relationship or the relationship itself to be 
instrumental only cannot account for the value of an intimate relationship.   
Moore speaks highly of interpersonal relationships’ value in both AP and PE.  He 
describes friendships as the sort of interpersonal relationships that meet the criteria of intimate 
relationships and explains that they possess significant intrinsic goodness.  In PE personal 
affection is the greatest of the goods Moore describes.  Despite Moore’s best efforts, his 
pluralistic version of a consequentialist moral theory fails to account for the final value of any 
interpersonal relationships and so cannot be said to even recognize the existence of those 
relationships that are accorded final value by their participants: intimate relationships.  
According to the normative structure of consequentialism only maximally good states of affairs 
have final value and it is this feature of Moore’s moral theory that creates inconsistencies 
between his account of morality and his account of the value of friendships.  Moore’s axiology 
explains that intimate relationships have intrinsic value.  However, this is not enough to allow his 
overall theory of moral rightness to capture the value of intimate relationships.  The normative 
framework of any maximizing form of consequentialism will prevent people in intimate 
relationships from being accorded final value since the value of all relationships will depend on 
the relationship’s place in a maximally good state of affairs.  Thus relationships, on Moore’s  




Chapter 6: Aristotle and the Value of Intimate Relationships 
 Aristotle’s account of ethics is well known and oft discussed.  Aristotle directly addresses 
friendships’ place in his ethical theory in books eight and nine of Nicomachean Ethics, hereafter 
NE.
147
  The discussion of friendships in NE explores both the defining characteristics and value 
of friendships.  It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aristotle’s account of friendship has been the 
focus of many articles on friendship and its specific place as part of a moral theory.
148
  The 
combination of Aristotle’s own detailed discussion of friendships and their place in his moral 
theory and the subsequent philosophical interest in his accounts of these subjects make his view 
of ethics one that must be examined in any discussion of interpersonal relationships and their 
value.  Aristotle examines several forms of friendship, but the criteria he uses to define character 
friendships qualify these relationships as intimate ones and part one of this chapter will explain 
this link.  Aristotle also provides a couple of arguments for the value of character friendships.  
These arguments will be discussed in part two of this chapter to figure out what they conclude 
about the value of character friendships.  Finally, in part three of this chapter the conclusions of 
part two will be analyzed and compared to the results of the analysis of G.E. Moore’s 
consequentialist theory.  This will paint a clearer picture of the categories of value character 
friendships fall into according to Aristotle. 
Part I: Aristotelian Friendships as Intimate Relationships 
 Aristotle uses the word “φιλία” to discuss many different interpersonal relationships even 
though it is most often translated to the English word “friendship.”  Some of the relationships 
that Aristotle delineates with the word “φιλία” are much more casual than intimate relationships 
while others meet all the criteria of intimate relationships’ definition.  This raises three questions 
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that must be addressed before proceeding to questions about the value of intimate relationships 
according to Aristotle: 1. what criterion unifies Aristotle’s various uses of the word “φιλία,” 2. 
what criteria separate the highest form of φιλία from its other forms, and 3. how do the criteria 
that Aristotle sets for the highest form of φιλία measure up to the criteria of intimate 
relationships. 
 Aristotle identifies three kinds of friendship in NE: friendship based on pleasure, utility, 
and character (NE 1156a7).  The reason people form a friendship, or the object of love in a 
friendship, is what distinguishes one kind of friendship from another (NE 1155b17).  
Nevertheless, all three relationships are friendships according to Aristotle because in all three the 
friends wish one another good for their own sake (NE 1156a3).  Aristotle reiterates this definition 
in the Rhetoric, when he writes “We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing 
for him what you believe to be good things not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, 
so far as you can, to bring these things about” (Rhetoric 1381a2).
149
  A.D.M. Walker argues in 
“Aristotle’s Account of Friendship in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” hereafter AAFNE, that mutual 
goodwill, along with reciprocal affection and a mutual awareness of the affection and goodwill, 
makes up necessary and sufficient conditions of any friendship.
150
  Yet, the idea of wishing 
another well for her own sake seems to be at odds with the self gratifying nature of pleasure and 
utility friendships.
151
  Aristotle writes “Now those who love each other for their utility do not 
love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other.  So 
too with those who love for the sake of pleasure” (NE1156a10).  Despite the concept of 
selflessness that seems to be involved in the unifying criterion of friendship, Aristotle also seems 
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clear that the reason for the love involved in friendships of pleasure and utility is a self serving 
one. 
 John Cooper addresses this apparent conflict in his article “Aristotle on the Forms of 
Friendship,” hereafter AFF.
152
  Cooper examines three possible interpretations of Aristotle’s 
claim that there exists mutual well wishing for the sake of the friend in all three kinds of 
friendship: that one wishes well for one’s friend so that one can get a benefit, that one merely 
wishes well for one’s friend but not for the friend’s sake, and that the well wishes are responses 
to the relationship and so grounded as much in the relationship’s past as its future.
153
 
First, Cooper is clear to explain what is and is not meant by Aristotle’s concept of 
wishing or acting “for the other’s sake.”  He writes that it means “…at least, that the fact that the 
other person needs or wants, or would be benefited by, something is taken by the agent as by 
itself a reason for doing or procuring that something, and that he acts for that reason” (AFF 621).  
It also means that this reason is sufficient but not necessarily the only or even the strongest 
motivating reason behind the action (AFF 621-622).  Additionally, Cooper points out “Nothing 
specific is implied about the psychological source or nature of the agent’s concern for the other 
person…” (AFF 622).  The concern may be motivated out of either a specific emotional 
attachment to the friend or a much more generic concern for the welfare of others. 
 When Aristotle writes “To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing 
goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons” one might interpret 
him as meaning that one could wish one’s friend well for the object of the friendship (NE 
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1156a3-5, AFF 631).  This does not pose a large problem in the case of character friendships, but 
is problematic when applied to pleasure and utility friendships; to wish one’s friend well for the 
pleasure or utility it will bring one does not qualify as wishing one’s friend well for her own 
sake.  For example, Michelle is Heather’s friend because she gets pleasure out of trying new ice 
cream parlors with Heather.  In this case, if Michelle wishes Heather well at her job simply so 
that Heather can continue to afford going to new ice cream parlors with Michelle, then Michelle 
is not wishing Heather well for her own sake but for the sake of Michelle’s continued pleasure.  
Thus, a charitable reader of Aristotle will reject this problematic interpretation.   
A second possibility is that Aristotle means that all friends must wish each other well, but 
not necessarily for their own sakes (AFF 632).  This possibility could be supported by the text in 
NE 1155b32-1156a5 where Aristotle declines to add the idea of the well wishing being for the 
friend’s own sake to the more isolated idea of well wishing he is examining.  However, Cooper 
argues that this too is unlikely considering how many other times in NE, the Rhetoric, and 
Eudemian Ethics Aristotle does combine the two ideas when discussing friendship (AFF 632).   
Finally, by examining why one wishes one’s character friend good for her own sake 
Cooper suggests that one wishes one’s pleasure and utility friends well in light of, or as a 
response to, the fact that they bring one pleasure and utility (AFF 633).  In this sense, one wishes 
one’s friends well for their own sakes not so much for prospective but for more retrospective 
reasons: more in appreciation for past good done for one than in anticipation of future good one 
might receive (AFF 633).  To return to the previous example, Michelle and Heather are pleasure 
friends whose relationship is founded on the pleasure they get from trying new ice cream parlors 
together.  Michelle may wish her pleasure friend Heather well because she genuinely wants 




simply for the purpose of receiving more pleasure from their friendship.  She is not, for example, 
wishing Heather well at her job simply so that she can continue to afford going to new ice cream 
parlors.  Importantly, as Cooper points out, Michelle would not wish Heather some good that 
would prevent further pleasure coming from the relationship or impede their relationship and the 
continuance of the pleasure Michelle received from the relationship, at least not as part of the 
well wishing that constituted their friendship.
154
  So, Michelle would not wish that Heather go on 
a diet that involved giving up ice cream even if doing so would make Heather more temperate 
(so long as the two are merely pleasure friends).  Certainly relationships like that of Michelle and 
Heather do exist in real life.  Teammates in casual sports leagues might often fall into this sort of 
relationship: they enjoy playing the sport together, may be familiar enough with one another to 
wish each other well, but not familiar enough with one another to wish them some good that 
would prevent the fielding of a full team and put a stop to the pleasure of playing the sport on a 
consistent basis. 
 It, then, does seem possible that all three kinds of friendship are unified by the criterion 
of mutual well wishing for the sake of the other.  This means that character friendships must be 
distinguished from pleasure and utility friendships by some criterion other than the selflessness 
of the well wishing that exists in all friendships.  Perhaps the most significant difference between 
character friendship and the other two kinds of friendship is the object of the relationship.  In a 
character friendship one is attracted not to the pleasure or utility that may come from one’s 
character friend but to the friend herself (NE 1156a7-8).  For this reason Aristotle points out that 
character friendships aim at the essential rather than incidental features of friends (NE 1156a18-
20, 1156b11-12, 1157b3-4).  Elijah Millgram writes “Being virtuous is a large part of what it is 
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to be a human being, whence of what it is to be the virtuous person that one is.  On the other 
hand, being useful to me and being pleasant to me are not a part of being who one is.”
155
  It is the 
friends’ natures that give rise to the friendly feelings that are the foundation of character 
friendships (NE 1156b10-11).  These are importantly different from the incidental features that 
give rise to the friendly feelings that ground pleasure and utility friendships.  For example, 
Michelle and Julie’s generosities are virtues that are essential parts of their characters, or who 
they are according to Aristotle: those generosities can give rise to friendly feelings that form the 
basis of a character friendship between the two.  Conversely, the pleasures Michelle and Heather 
get from trying new ice cream parlors together are incidental features of the two: the additional 
pleasures they get from enjoying the ice cream together are not a part of their characters, but they 
are what the two aim at in their pleasure friendship.  Cooper writes: 
Bearing in mind these important differences between character-friends and the other two 
types, one might say, with some justice, that only character-friends really love one 
another, that only they really wish one another well for one another’s sake.  By this, one 
would mean that only character-friends concern themselves with the actual persons, 
themselves, that their friends are (AFF 640-641).
156
 
Michelle may wish Heather well in her job without being directly concerned with her ability to 
afford her trips to new ice cream parlors, but Michelle’s lack of willingness to wish Heather the 
good of temperance shows that she is not concerned with Heather’s character as she is with that 
of Julie.  As a result, on Aristotle’s view Michelle is not concerned with Heather as an individual 
even when wishing Heather goods completely unrelated to Michelle’s pleasure.   
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A final difference between the kinds of friendship that Aristotle mentions is their 
durations (NE 1156a23-24,1156b11-12,33).  Character friendships last a long time due to their 
foundation in relatively stable moral characters (NE 1156b17).  On the other hand, “… the useful 
is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship is done away, 
the friendship is dissolved…” (NE 1156a23-24).  The same is true of pleasure friendships (NE 
1156a33-36).  This makes pleasure and utility friendships as transient as the pleasures and 
utilities they grant the friends: much more transient than character friendships. 
 Character friendships share the criterion of wishing others well for their own sakes with 
the other two kinds of friendship and are separated from them by their focus on the essential 
features of the friends.  Both of these criteria are important in identifying character friendships 
with intimate relationships in which the members love, wish, and act for one another mutually as 
an ends in themselves while trusting one another. 
 Aristotle specifically addresses each of the components of intimate relationships in his 
account of character friendships. The word Aristotle repeatedly uses to convey the love that 
exists in friendships is “στἐργειν” (NE 1156a15, 1157a11, 28, 1161bl8, 25, 1162a12, b30, 
1164a10, 1167a3, 1168a2, 7, 22).  Cooper writes that στἐργειν “… is used most often to apply to 
a mother’s love for her children and other such close family attachments” (AFF 629).  στἐργειν 
then conveys the idea that friends have strong positive emotions toward one another.  The 
affection Aristotle is discussing can exist in different levels and between different types of 
partners.  It would cover some of the feelings that exist between lovers, parents and their 
children, and those who share a close friendship as understood in a more colloquial sense.  
Aristotle writes about a social virtue that “For the man who corresponds to this middle state is 




from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one’s associates” (NE 1126b20-23).  
This emphasizes the necessity of affection as a component of friendship.  He adds “Now since 
friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving 
seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in 
due measure that are lasting friends and only their friendship that endures” (NE 1159a33-35).  
Moreover, Aristotle discusses the pleasure character friends will take in one another’s presence: 
“So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, 
since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good 
are the same or like” (NE 1156b15-18).  Thus, character friends and people in intimate 
relationships both feel love for one another and take pleasure in one another’s company.  The 
criteria of wishing one another well and acting for one another is clearly defined to be part of 
friendships in the aforementioned quotation from the Rhetoric: “We may describe friendly 
feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things not for your own 
sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about” (Rhetoric 
1381a2).  This quotation also mentions the idea of acting for the other as an end in herself, which 
was discussed previously as an identifying criterion of character friendships as opposed to 
pleasure and utility friendships.  Character friendships are based in the essential features of the 
friends so when one loves, wishes, and acts for one’s character friend one must also recognize 
those features of the friend that make her an end in herself.  Aristotle is also very clear that 
friendships must be mutual relationships when he writes “But to those who thus wish good we 
ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being 
friendship” (NE 1155b32-34).
157
  He also writes about the role of trust in character friendships 
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stating that potential friends do not actually become friends until trust exists between them (NE 
1156b28).  He adds “… and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that ‘he would never 
wrong me’ and all the other things that are demanded in true friendship are found” (NE 1157a22-
24).   
 Two other issues that Aristotle addresses are the equality of those involved in friendships 
and the ability of imperfectly moral people to be character friends.  The two issues are related to 
one another because if both people in a character friendship must be equals and morally perfect, 
then Aristotle’s definition of character friendship will be applicable to very few people.  Any 
value that such relationships have would be infrequently realized in the real world.  Aristotle 
writes that people who are quantitatively unequal will have difficulty being friends: “This 
becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else 
between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so” (NE 
1158b35).  He also writes “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in 
virtue” and “But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent for such men are rare” 
(NE 1156b6 and b24-25).  Cooper writes that this “… seems to imply that only to fully virtuous 
persons – heroes of intellect and character – is it open to form a [character friendship]” (AFF 
624).  Despite the seeming force of these points Aristotle also writes about friendships between 
unequal people such as fathers and sons and husbands and wives in book VIII chapter seven of 
NE.
158
  In the former case the two people are unequal in the authority they have over one another 
and in the second, according to Aristotle, unequal morally (AFF 628).  Nevertheless, “… the 
friendships of such persons will be abiding and excellent” as long as each party renders what 
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they ought to the other (NE 1158b20-25).  He also writes “… for not only can equally good men 
become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse…” (1162a36-1162b1). Thus, 
even those unequal in virtue can be character friends.  Cooper writes “So in this case we will 
have a virtue-friendship where the superior person likes the inferior for such virtues as he has (or 
some of them), while recognizing that his character is not totally good” (AFF 628).  This leaves 
open the possibility that neither friend needs to be morally perfect to engage in a character 
friendship. 
Part II: Aristotle’s Arguments for Friendships’ Value 
 Aristotle explicitly states “… friendship to be desirable in itself” (NE 1159a25).  Yet, 
Kant and Moore also claim that friendship is valuable as an end in itself and their theories could 
not account for such final value.  Aristotle, though, provides two arguments to support his claim: 
the arguments that a friend is necessary for self-knowledge and encourages virtuous activity.  
Each of these arguments concludes that friendship has contributory value to the final good.  
However, to fully understand the value of character friendships in Aristotle’s theory, one must 
first understand the general relationship of friendship to the highest of all goods: eudaimonia. 
 Aristotle famously claims that “every pursuit aims at some good” and that the highest 
good is eudaimonia, which is identified with “living well and doing well” (NE 1095a13-19).  It 
is eudaimonia that is what “... we call final without qualification that which is desirable in itself 
and never for the sake of something else” (NE 1097a34-35).  One who is living well is eudaimon 
and can be said to be happy and flourishing.  Aristotle admits that other things are valuable as 
ends in themselves too such as pleasure, reason, and virtue (NE 1097b1-3).  Aristotle also states 
that to live a flourishing or eudaimon life one must possess certain external goods as well (NE 




of the most important of these goods when he writes “For without friends no one would choose 
to live, though he had all other goods” (NE 1155a2-3).  Friendship then, and character friendship 
in particular, is a necessary component of the final or chief good in Aristotle’s view.  It has 
contributory value because it modifies the value experience of one’s life in a way that is not 
merely causal.  It is a necessary component of a flourishing life in the same way that earning 
money to buy something one wants is a necessary component of the value experience one has 
when enjoying the purchase.
159
  Aristotle, then, must explain how and why character friends 
contribute such value to the final good of human life with the self-knowledge argument and the 
argument that character friendships encourage moral activity. 
 The basic idea of the self-knowledge argument is that through one’s friend one can better 
see one’s own desires, actions, and actualized conception of the good life.  Aristotle writes: 
… we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than 
our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good 
men (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant) – if this be so, the 
supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate 
worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his 
friend have both these qualities (NE 1169b34-1170a4). 
This gives rise to a couple questions: what is the importance of knowing one’s own desires, 
actions, and actualized conception of a good life and why is it that a character friend is necessary 
to acquire this knowledge?  The answer to the former question lies in Aristotle’s prerequisites for 
a virtuous life and the answer to the latter lies in a more commonplace observation about human 
nature. 
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 Throughout NE Aristotle shows that one must have self-knowledge in order to live a 
good life.  In book three he explains that in order to act virtuously a man must know who he is, 
what he is doing, the principle he is acting on, and the end of the action (NE 1111a3-6).  In book 
two he emphasizes the need for the emotions to be felt at the right time, with the right motive, to 
the right object, and in the right way (NE 1106b20-23).  In order to habituate these emotions one 
must first know what one feels and that those emotions are right.  Moreover, one must have the 
practical wisdom to know “… what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general” (NE 
1140a28).  As Cooper puts it in “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle,” hereafter FGA, 
… having a good character, on Aristotle's theory, requires not merely correct practical 
judgments (having a certain reasoned conception of how one ought to live) but also, and 
even more, having this conception embedded in one's desires and thereby making it 
effective in one's actions. Thus to know one is virtuous requires knowing (1) what the 
desires are that in fact motivate one's actions, and (2) that these desires depend upon the 
same scheme of ends as one's reasoned conception defines for one's life.
160
 
Thus, for Aristotle one must know and choose the good life in addition to leading it to actually 
be considered flourishing. 
 According to Aristotle, character friends play a vital role in gaining the self-knowledge 
necessary for a human to flourish.  In character friendships friends are alike in virtue (NE 
1156b6-7).  Thus, character friends will act similarly. Each friend will benefit from the 
relationship by observing similar virtues and virtuous actions from a distance: this is conducive 
to greater objectivity.  Personal biases commonly affect one’s appraisal of one’s character and 
work: one’s perception of vices is repressed and virtues amplified.  The closeness to, and 
similarities, with a character friend give one access to a mirror-like image in which it is often 
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easier to recognize fault.  For example, when Michelle witnesses Julie’s tendency to be overly 
generous with her time she can come to recognize similarly excessive expressions of her own 
generosity.  Aristotelian character friends are close to one another, but their separateness 
prevents at least some personal bias from interfering with judgments of one’s friends’ actions 
and virtues.  At the same time, the acknowledged similarity of character friends makes the 
reapplication of those judgments to oneself relatively obvious.  Cooper further explores the 
usefulness of a character friend in self-assessing the character of even a perfectly virtuous 
person: 
To be sure, the qualities in himself he thinks virtuous are so, and he has no faults; but 
how is he to be sure that he is not deceiving himself in thinking these things, as he must 
be if he is to know what he is like? It is plausible to suggest, as our text does, that 
mistakes of this kind are not so apt to occur where one is observing another person and 
his life; here the facts, both about what are faults and what are virtues, are more likely, at 
least to speak for themselves (FGA 298). 
Nancy Sherman argues that the differences between character friends can provide significant self 
knowledge as well: 
But if another self need not be exactly similar, then self-knowledge might involve 
contrasting oneself with another, and considering how another would have acted in the 
same circumstances given that individual’s different point of view.  Aristotle’s 
introductory remarks in Metaphysics A have application here: ‘All human beings desire 




Self-knowledge, as a sub-species of knowledge, requires, ultimately, the discrimination 
of what is peculiarly one’s own.  Another and separate self facilitates that discovery.”
161
 
For example, it is worthwhile for Michelle to compare her actions to those of Julie because, 
though they are both virtuous, the relative mean of their generosities and the opportunities to 
express that virtue might be significantly different.  Thus, in contrasting her actions to those of 
Julie, Michelle may come to learn something about her own virtue or its expression through 
action. 
 The second argument that Aristotle gives to explain the value of character friendships is 
that they promote activity.  He writes 
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly.  Now if he were a 
solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; 
but with others and towards others it is easier.  With others therefore his activity will be 
more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is 
supremely happy (NE 1170a4-9). 
The happy man is, according to Aristotle, a virtuous one whose activities exemplify the virtues 
(NE 1169b30-34).  Therefore, the friendships that such a man fosters will help keep him 
continuously active in ways that will exemplify the virtues. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not go 
on to explain how friends are important to continuous activity.  Cooper argues that no subject 
matter is intrinsically interesting enough to continuously hold any individual’s attention 
indefinitely (FGA 308). Instead, some external influence must compliment a person’s natural 
attention in order to maintain her interest in even the most worthy of pursuits.  He then goes on 
to identify three reasons character friendship can be the supplement that humans need to 
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maintain interest in an activity: friends provide one another with reinforcement that their pursuits 
are meaningful, they increase one’s interest in and attachment to one’s activities, and they 
enlarge the scope of one’s activity (FGA 308).
162
   
By sharing one’s activity with a friend one is provided with the sense that one is not the 
only person who finds a particular interest worthwhile: when Michelle and Julie volunteer 
together they receive concrete evidence that they both see their work as important.  Furthermore, 
a character friend is someone who is morally good, so the confirmation comes from a reliably 
moral source.  Character friends share moral and intellectual pursuits.  This means that the kinds 
of activities being reaffirmed as valuable are those most vital to a flourishing life.  Cooper 
realizes that affirmation of an activity’s value need not come from character friends.  One could 
get such affirmation from the recognition that any other person one respects engages in it, but 
Cooper writes  
… what is in question here is not a person’s mere abstract knowledge that something is 
valuable and worthwhile but his actual direct experience of it as worthwhile… In a 
shared activity one knows of the commitment of others to the goodness of the activity in 
no mere abstract theoretical way.  It is concrete and immediate.  Hence it is only through 
participation in such activities that the confirmatory knowledge of others’ evaluations is 
likely to be both constantly and directly present to one’s consciousness (FGA 306). 
Thus, character friendships are necessary to maintain the virtuous activity that is a flourishing 
life. 
Cooper also argues that by sharing an activity friends can increase their attachment to, 
and interest in, the activity.  Michelle and Julie might enjoy working separately to raise money 
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for the Special Olympics, but their character friendship and the experience of the effort as mutual 
will likely increase their commitment to raising money and the effort they are willing to exert in 
order to successfully raise money.  Again, in cases like this the activity is shared with a character 
friend so the commitments being supported are moral ones that are a necessary part of any 
flourishing human life. 
The third way that Cooper thinks friendships can keep one active is by expanding the 
scope of one’s actions.  Cooper argues that by being a member of a group working toward a 
common end one indirectly participates in the work of other group members (FGA 307).  He 
bases this in the claim that “… one’s enjoyment, and so one’s interest in what one is doing, is not 
limited just to what one directly does oneself” (FGA 307).  If this is true, then even when one is 
not actually active one can be said to be pursuing the activity indirectly through the efforts of 
other group members; one is active in a sense that one pursuing a purely private interest cannot 
be.  According to Cooper, when Julie spends time during the week to organize a kickball 
fundraiser for the Special Olympics and Michelle helps run the same fundraiser on Saturday and 
Sunday morning, both are active all week long in the shared pursuit.
163
 
Part III: Aristotelian Friendships: Not Intrinsically Valuable But Necessary to Final Goods 
 On Aristotle’s view, unlike Kant’s and Moore’s, intimate relationships are necessary to 
the realization of final value.  Kantianism cannot account for the moral value of intimate 
relationships at all because motives based in emotion or interpersonal connections do not have 
moral worth.
164
  On the other hand, Aristotle grants that motivations that spring from the right 
emotions, which include love and affection in certain cases, are part of what make an action 
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morally right (NE 1106b20-23).  Moore is able to grant that intimate relationships have intrinsic 
value, that their value comes from their internal properties, but is unable to recognize intimate 
relationships as having final value because of the constraints of consequentialism’s normative 
framework.  Aristotle claims that friendship is desirable in itself and then provides the arguments 
from increased self knowledge and increased activity to explain the value of the intimate 
relationships he terms character friendships (NE 1159a25). 
 Aristotle makes the cultivation of appropriate emotional responses to situations a central 
part of his general ethical theory.  The doctrine of the mean explains that virtues involve feeling 
the emotions neither too much nor too little, but always in the right amount, at the right time, to 
the right object, and in the right way (NE 1106b18-23).  Aristotle writes “Now virtue is 
concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while 
the intermediate is praised and is a form of success” (NE 1106b24-26).  For Aristotle morally 
appropriate emotional responses are important to any virtuous endeavor, including friendships.  
For example, in his discussion of unequal friendships he writes “In all friendships implying 
inequality the love also should be proportional…” (NE 1158b24-25).  Additionally, as previously 
explored, emotions are themselves a vital part of character friendships.
165
  Thus, how and when 
one feels any of the emotions helps determine one’s moral character.  As a result, the emotions 
particularly related to intimate relationships, such as love for one’s friends or family members, 
are of equally moral import according to Aristotle:  how much love a father shows his son or a 
woman shows her lover reveals part of those people’s moral characters. 
 Aristotle states that friendships are desirable in themselves (NE 1159a25).  This might 
indicate that intimate relationships have intrinsic and/or final value on his view.  However, the 
two arguments he gives to explain the value of character friendships seem to lead to a different 
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conclusion.  Neither the argument that character friends serve as second selves nor the argument 
that they encourage moral activity show that intimate relationships have intrinsic value.  Both 
argue for the conclusion that character friendships are necessary components of the final good: a 
flourishing human life.  The value to be found according to these arguments is not in the 
character friendships themselves but in their relationship to human life.  If humans were 
constituted differently, then character friendships might not be valuable at all.
166
  Thus, intimate 
relationships are extrinsically valuable according to Aristotle.  Yet, this fact does not prevent 
them from contributing necessarily to the final value of a flourishing human life.   
The normative framework of consequentialism subordinates the value of all intrinsic 
goods to their place in a state of affairs that contains the maximal amount of goodness.  On the 
other hand, Aristotelian ethics recognizes the necessity of intimate relationships to the final good 
of eudemonia.  According to Moore’s theory, no particular friendship must be a part of the 
maximally good state of affairs that is the end of moral action.  In fact, it is possible that no 
friendship at all would exist in a maximally good state of affairs.
167
  However, Aristotle’s two 
arguments for the value of character friendships show that particular friendships must be a part 
of a particular person’s flourishing, part of that person’s final good.  Character friendships are 
irreplaceable parts of the final good in Aristotle’s ethics and, therefore, have contributory value.  
Alternately, they are eminently replaceable in Moore’s conception of the final good and, thus, 
only instrumentally valuable.  A return to Lewis’s example of contributory good can further 
clarify this point.
168
  The work a boy does to earn the money for a circus ticket is not merely a 
means to the pleasure he gets from going to the circus; the work is necessary to the final good of 
pleasure that the boy gets.  Without the work he puts into earning the ticket, the final good would 
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be qualitatively and quantitatively different.  According to Aristotle’s arguments for the value of 
character friendships, the same is true of the good in a human life with friendship: it would be 
both qualitatively and quantitatively different without the friendship.  Yet, Moore’s 
consequentialism cannot recognize the qualitative difference between two scenarios.  The 
quantitative difference a friendship makes in the final good is of sole importance in Moore’s 
view, which is why any friendship is replaceable by any other good that would have the same 
quantitative impact on the final good; in other words, no friendship is necessary to or has 
contributory value towards the final good according to maximizing forms of consequentialism.  
For Moore, all friendships must be only instrumentally good.  Aristotle’s ability to recognize the 
centrality of friendships to the final good of human flourishing enables his theory to avoid the 
criticism leveled at Moore’s theory: that treating relationships as instrumentally valuable is 
incompatible with recognizing them as intimate relationships.
169
  Aristotelian character 
friendships have contributory value so Aristotle can consistently claim both that one should treat 
one’s friends as ends in themselves and that those friendships are morally valuable even without 
arguing for their intrinsic value. 
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Chapter 7: The Value of Care and Relationships in the Ethics of Care 
 The ethics of care is a much younger approach to ethics but it is an approach built around 
the idea that interpersonal relationships have moral value.  As a result, the role of these 
relationships and their value in the normative structure of the ethics of care is a bit more 
straightforward than it is in the normative structure of any of the previously discussed theories.  
A clear discussion of the value of care and relationships according to the ethics of care must 
begin with an analysis of care itself and proceed to an explanation of the connection between 
care and interpersonal relationships.  Then, one can better appreciate value’s place in the ethics 
of care and understand what type of value intimate relationships have according to the theory.  
One of the clearest and most comprehensive accounts of care’s meaning in the ethics of care is 
given by Virginia Held in The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, hereafter EOC.
170
  
Thus, Held’s account of the ethics of care in EOC will be the specific version of the theory 
explored in this dissertation. 
Part I: What is Care and How is it Tied to Interpersonal Relationships 
 One would be correct to assume that a theory of ethics called the “ethics of care” places a 
moral premium on the concept of “care.”  Each theorist that considers himself or herself to be 
developing an ethics of care defines “care” in a slightly different way.  According to Held care 
has several meanings: it is an activity, a practice, a standard, and a value.
171
   
Care is an activity in the sense that it is a “form of labor” in which people care for others 
and, in so doing, form caring interpersonal relationships.
172
  Held and, as she notes, many other 
ethicists of care stress the idea that the work of actually caring for others is an important 
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component of care’s definition.
173
  Actively caring for others can include actions without direct 
contact between the people giving and receiving care.
174
  She also writes that care cannot be 
broken down into individual events or even a string of such events (EOC 42).  Rather, along with 
the standard of the activity of caring they form a practice
175
.   
Care is a standard as well as an activity according to Held, and in combination the two 
form a practice.  As a standard care can be used to judge the effectiveness of an actual caring 
activity, the motive for the activity, whether it builds trust, whether it builds mutual concern, and 
whether it builds connection (EOC 36, 42).  A beneficent activity done without consideration for 
the effectiveness of the activity cannot be considered good care.  Such activities might harm 
rather than help another person, and a lack of concern over this possibility shows a lack of care.  
For example, if Steve tries to help Jared by having him drink excessive amounts of water when 
Jared’s sodium levels are already depleted from a marathon, then Jared may be harmed by 
Steve’s actions.  Furthermore, if Steve is unconcerned with the effectiveness of his help or the 
possibility of harming Jared, then he cannot be said to be caring for Jared.  The practice of caring 
for Jared would entail Steve actually doing what it takes to replenish Jared’s nutrients and fluids 
effectively, motivated by his affection for Jared, in such a way that builds trust, mutual concern, 
and connection between Jared and Steve.  Thus, the reason one is helping is also relevant to the 
activity’s qualification as care.  Held writes, “Yet all care involves attentiveness, sensitivity, and 
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responding to needs” (EOC 39).  The motive behind an action must be appraised before judging 
whether an action or practice can be considered caring.  This point is made clearest in Held’s 
evaluation of welfare policy: even if the dictates of justice are met fully by making substantial 
payments to those with little or no income, without the correct motive the aid cannot be 
considered good care.  Without attentiveness, sensitivity, and responsiveness to the needs of 
those receiving the payments such aid can be psychologically harmful and isolating (EOC 40). 
Additionally, caring activity helps form and strengthens caring relationships by building trust, 
mutual concern, and connection.
176
   
Care is also a moral value on par with justice according to Held.  As a value, care picks 
out particular morally salient features of practices, people, and relationships (EOC 38).  Thus, 
rather than generally claiming that a particular practice of helping another is morally good, 
saying that the practice is a caring practice would mean it is morally good in a specific way: it 
meets or exceeds the standards of a caring practice previously discussed.  Alternately, saying that 
a particular interpersonal relationship is a caring one would mean that it is morally good because 
it involves mutual concern, trust, responsiveness to the needs of the members of the relationship, 
and feelings of connection between the members.  Held later explains the source of care’s moral 
value: 
Care seems to me to be the most basic of moral values.  Without care as an empirically 
describable practice, we cannot have life at all since human beings cannot survive 
without it.  Without some level of caring concern for other human beings, we cannot have 
any morality.  These requirements are not just empirical givens.  In every context of care, 
moral evaluations are needed.  Then, without some level of caring moral concern for all 
other human beings, we cannot have a satisfactory moral theory (EOC 73). 
                                                 
176




One of the features of the ethics of care that makes it different from the previously 
discussed theories of ethics is the centrality of interpersonal relationships.  Most ethicists of care, 
including Held, criticize the liberal individualism of Kantianism, utilitarianism, and even 
Aristotelian ethics.  They find the idea that the ideal, or even normal, moral human agent is an 
unencumbered individual actor influencing the world around her to be dramatically flawed.  This 
view misrepresents the actual state of human beings as necessarily dependent on others at least 
during their youth and, frequently, interdependent on others throughout their lives (EOC 14).   
Yet, the view that humans act as individuals uninfluenced morally by their relationships 
is the one that informs Kantian and consequentialist ethics.  Kant places the highest value on the 
good will, the cultivation of which requires no help or relationships with others.
177
  Similarly, 
Moore’s version of consequentialism envisions the moral agent as an individual who must 
objectively choose whichever action creates the most good.
178
  Even Aristotle for the greater part 
of the Nicomachean Ethics focuses on the individual’s cultivation of a virtuous character.
179
   
In contrast, Held emphasizes the connectedness of individuals to one another.  She 
clearly states “It is characteristic of the ethics of care to view persons as relational and as 
interdependent… to many care theorists persons are at least partly constituted by their social 
ties” (EOC 46).  She also points out that autonomy itself can be conceived of as a relational 
ability: 
Often, we learn to be autonomous through our interactions with others though we are not 
prisoners of our upbringings and circumstances.  Our personal, familial, social, political, 
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and economic relations with others enable or inhibit our access to significant options. 
And we are both enmeshed in and capable of shaping such relations (EOC 48). 
 
Thus, each individual human is necessarily involved in some interpersonal relationships. 
 It is this environment in which caring as an activity, practice, standard, and value can be 
cultivated.  Caring, in all its forms, is necessarily tied to the existence of interpersonal 
relationships which are a necessary part of human life.  The caring that Held discusses cannot 
take place outside of interpersonal relationships.  Held stresses the ties between the concepts of 
caring and interpersonal relationships repeatedly.  She writes, “Caring is a relation in which carer 
and cared-for share an interest in their mutual well-being” (EOC 34-35).  She adds, “In my view, 
as we clarify care, we need to see it in terms of caring relations” (EOC 36).  She drives home the 
point again as she writes: 
Care is not the same as benevolence, in my view, since it is more the characterization of a 
social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social relations are 
not reducible to individual states… The values of care are especially exemplified in 
caring relations, rather than in persons as individuals (EOC 42). 
Of course, not all interpersonal relationships are caring relationships, in the sense that they are 
morally valuable.  Some relationships may be morally neutral and some may be morally bad 
(EOC 37). However, caring in all its forms occurs only in the midst of interpersonal 
relationships. 
Part II. The Ethics of Care as Distinct from Virtue Theory 
 One important question facing the ethics of care is how it is different from virtue ethics.  
This question is significant for the status of the ethics of care as a distinct approach to normative 




theory, then the actual value of intimate relationships may not be different on Aristotle’s and 
Held’s views.  Some theorists often labeled as ethicists of care do describe normative theories 
that are very similar to virtue ethics.  Michael Slote and Lawrence Blum both describe care as a 
virtue.
180
  Sara Ruddick too spends a great deal of effort discussing the virtues.
181
  However, 
Held clearly draws a line between her version of the ethics of care and virtue theory.  In 
criticizing Blum’s approach to care, Held writes: 
… he sees the care virtues, in line with the virtue theory tradition, as altruistic 
dispositions of individuals and psychological motivations.  This misses the heart of what 
goes on in practices of caring and misses what is of most value in them, which is that 
they are caring relations. What I am suggesting is that care, if not the traditional virtues, 
can extricate us from the overly personal perspective of the virtue tradition and the 
excessive contemporary focus on individual psychology… (EOC 35). 
Held also argues that viewing care as a virtue entails too much of a focus on dispositions and 
motives thus losing sight of the equal import morality should accord actual work (EOC 35, 51).  
For example, Jared may ascribe to virtue theory and focus his attention on cultivating his 
sensitivity to and affection for Steve at the expense of actually helping Steve when he needs 
assistance.  One might wonder how this is possible when many virtue theorists, such as Aristotle, 
try to tie action so closely to virtue.
182
  While virtue theorists do discuss the importance of action, 
the moral value of action is often less clear.  The virtues and character of the individual become 
the focal point of moral value.  Thus, according to Held, Jared may act whenever Steve needs 
assistance, but by following virtue theory he risks losing sight of the moral importance of those 
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actions relative to the virtues as well as the moral importance of the relationship itself.  Were 
Jared to subscribe to the ethics of care instead of virtue theory he would remain aware of his 
motives and dispositions while assigning equal value to the labor of caring for Steve.  This 
would also help reinforce Jared’s concern for the effectiveness of his efforts in caring for Steve.  
According to Held, then, there are significant differences between virtue theory and the ethics of 
care: virtue theory is unable to directly assign value to the relationships themselves or the work 
that helps constitute them. 
Part III. Intimate Relationships as Caring Relationships 
The definition of caring relationships explained by Held is broader than the definition of 
intimate relationships.  Nevertheless, relationships in which the members love one another, wish 
one another well, act for one another, do so mutually or for one another, and trust that each loves 
and wishes the other well as an end in himself are a subset of caring relations.  Held references 
each component of intimate relationships in her discussion of relationships that embody all four 
meanings of care, which will hereafter simply be termed “caring relationships.” 
The most notable difference between a caring relationship’s and an intimate 
relationship’s requirements is that the members of the relationship love one another.  This is not 
a necessary component of a caring relationship, but it does support the requirement that the 
members of a caring relationship feel connected with one another.  Additionally, in explaining 
her disagreement with Diemut Bubeck’s ethic of care Held supports the idea that properly aimed 
affection does contribute to some caring relationships (EOC 32).  This is again reflected in 
Held’s focus on the motive behind an action as being an important piece of a caring practice 
(EOC 33).  Therefore, though love is not necessary to a caring relationship it can certainly help 




Held addresses the importance of wishing one another well in a caring relationship when 
she discusses the importance of concern for others in a relationship and the appropriate motives 
involved in caring practices.  She mentions several times that mutual concern is a vital part of 
caring relationships (EOC 36, 38, 42).  Moreover, she explains that “… merely going through the 
motions of a caring activity and doing the work – for instance feeding the infant, but without any 
of the appropriate feelings or intentions of seeking her well-being – would not be caring either” 
(EOC 54).
183
  Thus, the people in caring relationships do wish one another well as do people in 
intimate relationships. 
Perhaps more important to Held, however, is the idea that people in caring relationships 
do not stop at merely wishing one another well but act on these wishes to help one another be 
well.  The activity of care is, after all, considered “work” and “labor” in the sense that it is 
helping others (EOC 36).  As discussed previously, actively caring for others is a central part of 
the definition of care that can only take place in relationships. 
In intimate relationships each member of the relationship is treated as an end in herself.  
Held’s discussion does not, on the surface, address this as a requirement for caring relationships.  
Yet, a closer look shows that there are strong similarities between how people in intimate and 
caring relationships treat one another.  Throughout Held’s explanation of caring relationships 
there are many instances in which it becomes apparent that people in caring relationships do not 
treat one another merely as means to some other end.  The notions of mutual respect and mutual 
autonomy to which Held refers offer strong evidence to suggest that caring relationships, like 
intimate ones, involve people who treat one another as more than means to other ends.  In 
comparing caring relationships to relationships that are ultimately harmful, Held concludes that 
“The person who participates in an admirable practice of care will not only respect himself but 
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will foster mutual respect and mutual sensitivity” (EOC 56).  The idea of mutual respect not only 
implies self respect and respect of the other in a relationship, but would also seem to be at odds 
with the treatment of either member of the relationship as a means to an end.  This is further 
supported by the examples of harmful relationships, a servile housewife and martyr mother, in 
which the women are treating themselves as means to some other ends (EOC 56).  Held’s 
exploration of mutual autonomy also bolsters this view: 
Mutual autonomy… includes mutual understandings and acceptances of how much 
sharing of time, space, daily decisions, and so on there will be, and how much 
independently arrived at activity… The tendency to equate caring with a kind of 
overbearing attention, benevolent but smothering, is a distorted but widespread view of 
care.  Care as a disposition often misleads people into thinking they are caring when they 
only have the good motives of wanting to care, to help others, to be benevolent, and so 
on, however much the intention misrepresents the recipient’s wishes and perceptions and 
however much such good intentions may fail to contribute to a caring relation (EOC 55). 
 
The idea that the understanding and acceptance of decisions must be mutual supports an 
inference to the conclusion that people in caring relationships must treat one another as goals not 
means, especially when coupled with the previously mentioned focus on people not treating 
themselves as a means to an end.  The importance of mutual understanding and acceptance of 
decisions is especially evident in the practice of care that exists for hospice and palliative care 
patients.  In these instances it is vitally important that there is a strong emphasis on 
communication between the patient and caregiver so that the goals of both are clear and aligned.  
Held’s critique of non-caring relationships also shows that benevolent intentions are not enough 




relationships respond to and are motivated by one another as particular persons and not as mere 
representatives of humanity or by universal principles of benevolence.
184
  Thus, people in caring 
relationships treat one another neither as means to an end nor as the objects of universal 
benevolence: people in caring relationships treat one another much the same as those in intimate 
relationships.  One might then, justifiably, wonder why Held does not ever mention treating 
others in caring relationships as ends in themselves.  The reason for this omission may lie in 
Held’s belief that the caring relationship is not completely distinct from the individuals in it 
(EOC 46, 101).  The relationship is an end in itself, and to envision each individual in the 
relationship as an end in himself that is completely separable from the relationship would be to 
skew what Held sees as the reality of caring relationships.
185
  Alternately, Held may simply 
believe that the notion of respecting others covers the relevant moral considerations.
186
  
Nevertheless, what is important about people in intimate relationships treating one another as 
ends in themselves is captured in Held’s description of how people in caring relationships should 




For a relationship to be considered a caring one, the relationship cannot be unidirectional: 
there must be some reciprocation.  This point is addressed in several places in EOC.  Held states 
that “A caring relationship requires mutuality and the cultivation of ways of achieving this in the 
various contexts of interdependence in human life” (EOC 53).  She also writes of mutual concern 
between members of a caring relationship and pursuing mutual interests.
188
  Held adds that “In 
normal cases, recipients of care sustain caring relations through their responsiveness – the look 
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of satisfaction in the child, the smile of the patient” (EOC 36).  The importance of mutuality is 
also acknowledged indirectly when Held describes harmful relationships that become too one-
sided such as those that become dominating or exploitative (EOC 37).  Held is also clear in 
stating that the mutuality does not have to be even and that the members of a relationship need 
not be equals.
189
  For example, the previous quote references the “look of satisfaction in the 
child” and “the smile of a patient” which, most often, do not approximate the work of a parent or 
health care practitioner in garnering those responses.  Furthermore, neither parents and children 
nor health care practitioners and patients are equals in terms of authority or power over one 
another.
190
  Caring relationships, then, are the same as intimate relationships in that both require 
mutuality between the members but do not require that the reciprocation between members or the 
members themselves be equal. 
Held is very clear that trust is also a necessary component of caring relationships.  She 
explains that “Care is not the same thing as trust, but caring relations should be characterized by 
trust, and caring and trust sustain each other” and “… good caring relations require and are 
characterized by [trust]” (EOC 42, 56).  Thus, both intimate relationships and caring 
relationships must be trusting relationships. 
Part IV. The Final Value of Intimate Relationships in the Ethics of Care 
Intimate relationships are a subset of caring relationships, distinguished primarily by the 
love one feels for the other in an intimate relationship.  Thus, whatever value caring relationships 
are accorded by Held will be shared by intimate relationships.  Held never uses the terms 
intrinsic, extrinsic, or final value in EOC but there is evidence that implies she views caring 
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relationships as having final value.  For example, in comparing virtue theory’s emphasis on 
dispositions to the ethics of care she writes: “Caring relations have primary value” (EOC 19).  
Later, she decries the view that relationships should be valued only instrumentally as serving 
individual interests (EOC 101).  She also explains on several occasions that caring as a practice, 
and by implication the relationships in which caring takes place, is a value as morally important 
as that of justice.
191
  It is clear that deontological theories of justice see justice as more than a 
means, but as an end in itself.
192
  It also seems clear throughout Held’s writing, in which caring 
relationships have such a central role, that these relationships are not mere means to some other 
ends but are valued as ends-in-themselves, as final goods.  If the ethics of care places the highest 
value on the notion of care as a practice, then certainly the relationships that embody that care 
are a close second if not inseparable first.   
On the other hand, it is a bit less obvious whether caring relationships are intrinsically or 
extrinsically valuable according to the ethics of care.  If forced to choose between the two Held 
believes that caring relationships are intrinsically valuable.
193
  Since caring relationships are 
central to the ethics of care it makes sense to think of them as intrinsically valuable.  An ethicist 
of care applying G.E. Moore’s isolation test to caring relationships would be unlikely to deny the 
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worth of a caring relationship even if it were the only thing that exists.  Thus, unlike Aristotelian 
friendships caring relationships, and by implication intimate relationships, are valuable as final 





Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 Intimate relationships are those interpersonal relationships that deeply connect people 
with one another.  Some of these relationships are entered into freely and exist between people 
with no authority and power over one another such as those between close friends.  Other 
intimate relationships are established in large part by the circumstances of one’s birth and exist 
between people of unequal authority and power over one another such as those between parents 
and their children.  In both cases, however, relationships in which the members love one another, 
wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, and trust that each loves and wishes 
the other well as an end in himself are morally valuable.  On this point each of the theorists this 
dissertation examines agrees.  Immanuel Kant declares that there is a duty to cultivate 
friendships, a subset of intimate relationships.
194
  G.E. Moore considers the goods of friendships 
to be highly intrinsically valuable.
195
  Aristotle writes clearly at the beginning of book VIII in 
Nicomachean Ethics, “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other 
goods.”
196
  Virginia Held recognizes caring relationships, of which intimate relationships are a 
subset, as focal points of moral value.
197
  The normative theories proposed by Kant and Moore, 
however, fail to accommodate their own views on the moral import of friendships.  Aristotle’s 
and Held’s normative theories can successfully account for the moral value they attribute to 
intimate relationships.  An examination of each theory’s failure or success reveals some of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that a normative theory must meet in order to account for the 
moral value of friendships.  Additionally, several other notable conclusions about the value of 
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intimate relationships according to normative theories can be made from said examination: 
intimate relationships need not be assigned intrinsic value, morally valuable relationships need 
not be restricted to friendships, it is helpful for a normative theory to acknowledge humans’ 
social natures, and it is helpful for a normative theory to recognize the moral value of particular 
things in the world.  
Part I: Necessary Conditions for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of 
Intimate Relationships 
 Kant’s ethics is unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as 
friendships because on his view motives of attachment, such as love, and the actions to which 
they give rise have no moral value.
198
  Kant’s insistence that the sole moral motive is reason’s 
respect for duty causes two interrelated problems when his theory is used to appraise the worth 
of intimate relationships.  First, a necessary component of intimate relationships, the love that 
exists between the members of the relationship, remains morally unappreciated by Kant’s view.  
Kantians can assign positive moral value to other components of intimate relationships, for 
example the members’ willingness to act for one another as ends.  However, the lack of moral 
focus on love and the attachment between those in intimate relationships leaves any moral value 
that exists in these relationships unconnected to the particular individuals in those relationships.  
In other words, even when two close friends treat one another as ends in themselves, and are 
motivated by reason alone, their actions are not morally different from two similarly motivated 
strangers treating one another as ends in themselves.  Furthermore, insofar as the actions that 
nurture intimate relationships are motivated by love of the individual other rather than reason 
they are not morally valuable at all: treating another as an end in himself is morally good only so 
long as one is doing so in response to duty’s dictates.  Kant’s unwillingness to admit either 
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emotions or particular other people as moral motivations results in his normative theory’s 
inability to recognize friendship, or any other intimate relationship, as morally valuable.
199
 
 This leads to the first condition that a normative theory must meet in order to 
acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships. 
Necessary Condition 1: The love that exists between those in intimate relationships or the 
actions motivated by this love must be candidates for moral goodness.  Not every 
instance of love between intimate relations or every action motivated by love must be 
morally good according to a normative theory but at least some must. 
Kantianism’s failure in this regard forces Barbara Herman, who would like to salvage the value 
of intimate relationships in Kantian ethics, to conclude that their value lies outside the sphere of 
morality.
200
  Love for another as an end in himself is a necessary component of intimate 
relationships.  Any normative theory that excludes love or all actions that are motivated by love 
from the realm of moral value will be unable to capture the value of intimate relationships.  
Therefore, it is a necessary condition of a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of 
intimate relationships that the theory includes some instances of love or some actions motivated 
by love among the valuable things in the world.
201
  This condition is necessary, but not 
sufficient.  Moore’s theory is an example that proves this to be true.  Though Moore’s, 
Aristotle’s, and Held’s normative theories all value love as good or as a good motive for action, 
Moore’s theory is still unable to account for the value of intimate relationships such as 
                                                 
199
 Part II will further address the issue of Kantianism’s failure to address particulars and that failure’s impact on 
Kantianism’s ability to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships. 
200
 Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pg 187.  See Chapter 
4 Part V of this dissertation for further explanation of this point. 
201







  The ability of Moore’s consequentialism to assign value to love and actions 
motivated by love is not enough to ensure that the theory can appreciate the value of intimate 
relationships. 
 Moore’s consequentialism assigns intrinsic value to friendships, but it is unable to 
account for the value of intimate relationships because only maximally good states of affairs 
have final value.
203
  Moore’s consequentialism combines his particular value theory with the 
traditional consequentialist normative structure.  In terms of valuing friendships, his axiology is 
promising.  Unlike Kant, Moore’s axiology highly values love in the form of personal affection.  
However, the normative structure of consequentialism recognizes only states of affairs 
containing the greatest amount of good as final ends.  According to Moore’s consequentialism 
the only thing that is an end in itself, the only thing that is a goal rather than a means, is that 
attainable version of the world that contains the greatest amount of good.  This valuation of 
goods is incompatible with the recognition of intimate relationships.  Intimate relationships by 
definition, including friendships by Moore’s definition, exist between people who value one 
another and the relationship that exists between them as final goods, or ends in themselves.
204
  
No particular Moorean friendship is a necessary part of the maximally good state of affairs that is 
the final good according to consequentialism.  For example, Steve must value Shivang and the 
relationship that exists between them as final ends for that relationship to meet the criteria of an 
intimate relationship.  However, consequentialism’s normative structure makes it unable to 
recognize either Shivang or the relationship between Steve and Shivang as a final end: both 
Shivang and the relationship may need to be sacrificed as a means to the production of a 
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maximally good state of affairs.  On the other hand, if Shivang and the relationship are a part of 
the maximally good state of affairs according to Moore’s consequentialism they are preserved or 
further cultivated only as a means to their part in the maximally good state of affairs.  They can 
in neither case be accorded final value by Moore’s consequentialism. 
 This provides the basis of another condition that any normative theory must meet in order 
to accurately detail the value of intimate relationships.   
Necessary Condition 2: A normative theory must value individuals in relationships as 
final ends, or ends in themselves.   
This condition, in conjunction with the first, allows for the induction of several more necessary 
conditions. 
Normative theories that cannot assign final value to individuals cannot address the value 
of intimate relationships because they fail to recognize a component piece of those relationships.  
An interpersonal relationship that qualifies as an intimate one must involve individuals who 
recognize one another as final goods.  Similarly, a normative theory that recognizes only 
instrumental value in individuals cannot acknowledge the existence of intimate relationships as 
morally valuable entities, because it denies the existence of one part of intimate relationships: 
people who have final value.  This condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value 
of intimate relationships is necessary because any theory that fails to accommodate the view that 
people have final value cannot recognize the existence of intimate relationships as morally 
valuable. 
This problem parallels the problem which gives rise to the first necessary condition for a 
normative theory’s ability to account for the value of intimate relationships.  In both cases the 




relationship’s definition.  In the first case it is Kantianism’s inability to accept love or actions 
motivated by love as morally good that leads to the conclusion that all normative theories must 
admit that some instances of love or some actions motivated by love have moral value in order to 
appreciate the moral value of intimate relationships.  In the second case, it is Moore’s theory of 
ethics that fails to leave room for a particular piece of an intimate relationship’s definition: that 
the people in intimate relationships are ends in themselves.  In both cases the conditions are 
necessary but not sufficient.  The parallels of these two examples provide the premises of an 
induction to further necessary conditions:   
Necessary Conditions 3-6: A normative theory that can account for the value of intimate 
relationships must not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances of 
wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so mutually, and trusting one 
another. 
These conditions, like the two already addressed, are each necessary: the failure of a normative 
theory to meet any one of them would prevent that theory from acknowledging the existence of 
intimate relationships.  However, no one condition is sufficient as is evidenced by Moorean 
consequentialism’s satisfaction of necessary condition 1, Kantianism’s satisfaction of necessary 
condition 2 and both theories’ failures to account for the value of intimate relationships. 
Each of these six necessary conditions is more conservative than it might be.  An 
alternate version of necessary conditions 1-6 is: 
Aggressive Version of Necessary Conditions 1-6: any normative theory that can account 
for the value of intimate relationships must assign value to some instances of loving 
another, wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats 




In addition to the more precarious nature of the aggressive conditions, these conditions also have 
the drawback of being uncharitable when applied to various normative theories.  This is why I 
will not defend the more aggressive versions of the conditions.  My reason for wanting to remain 
charitable in applying these conditions to particular normative theories will be made clearer 
when I examine the sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to account for the value 
of intimate relationships in the next section.  Furthermore, I will also address whether or not 
these conditions are jointly sufficient to a normative theory’s ability to account for the value of 
intimate relationships in the next section. 
Part II: A Sufficient Condition for a Normative Theory’s Ability to Capture the Value of 
Intimate Relationships 
 Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories succeed where Kant’s and Moore’s fail: they 
are able to capture the value of intimate relationships.  Their theories do not explicitly or 
implicitly deny the value of any of the criteria of intimate relationships.  Additionally, both 
theories grant that intimate relationships are more than merely instrumentally valuable.  This 
leads to a sufficient condition for a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate 
relationships: any normative theory that recognizes intimate relationships as more than 
instrumentally valuable will be able to assign value to intimate relationships. 
 Aristotle provides two arguments to explain his claim that friendships, which are intimate 
relationships, are good: the argument that friendships aid in the acquisition of self-knowledge 
and the argument that friendships encourage moral activity.
205
  Each of these arguments supports 
the contributory value of friendships to the final good.  The final value of eudaimonia cannot be 
reached without friendships.  Friendships, according to Aristotle, are not simply valuable as a 
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means to eudaimonia, but as a vital component of the sort of life that can achieve the final good.  
Friendships do not just cause the value of eudaimonia, but actually modify the experienced value 
of a well-lived life.  Aristotle also notes the centrality of interpersonal relationships to the 
definition of a human.  He writes: “…man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live 
with others.”
206
  Furthermore, he notes “Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by 
nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples…”
207
 
 Held goes even further than Aristotle and argues that caring relationships, of which 
intimate relationships are a subset, possess final and intrinsic value.  According to Held, caring 
relationships are ends in themselves.
208
  Held too explains the necessity of caring relationships to 
human life when she writes “Without care as an empirically describable practice, we cannot have 
life at all since human beings cannot survive without it.”
209
  Caring relationships act as a locus 
for caring activities, a place for those activities to occur. 
 Aristotle and Held’s success in capturing the value of intimate relationships is directly 
related to their arguments for the value of intimate relationships as being more than 
instrumental.
210
  Both normative theories meet the necessary conditions described in the previous 
section, but they also go further and attribute more than instrumental value to intimate 
relationships themselves.  Therefore, another condition for a normative theory’s ability to 
recognize the value of intimate relationships is: 
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Sufficient Condition 1: A normative theory must ascribe more than instrumental value to 
intimate relationships.   
This condition is sufficient, because any normative theory that can consistently describe the 
value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will be able to capture the value 
of intimate relationships.  It is also important to note that any theory that can consistently explain 
the value of intimate relationships as being more than instrumental will also meet all the 
necessary conditions mentioned in the previous section.  There would have to be inconsistencies 
in any normative theory that explicitly or implicitly denied the value of any component piece of 
an intimate relationship and still assigned final value, for example, to intimate relationships.  
Many normative theories, however, may fail to specifically address the value of each component 
piece of an intimate relationship’s definition.  Yet, if a normative theory assigns final goodness 
to some intimate relationships and there is no evidence that the theory explicitly or implicitly 
denies the value of any component piece of these relationships one may charitably grant there are 
no internal inconsistencies in the theory and that it does successfully capture the value of 
intimate relationships.  This is the reason I chose more charitable formulations of the necessary 
conditions explained in the previous section.  It is also worth noting that even when combined 
necessary conditions 1-6 are not coextensive with the sufficient condition currently under 
discussion.  The necessary conditions discussed in the previous section only require that a 
normative theory allow for some value of the component pieces of intimate relationships.  Those 
conditions do not specify that the value of the component pieces must be final values, except in 
the case of necessary condition two where treatment as a final value is part of the criterion itself.  
For example, the mutuality that exists in intimate relationships could be appraised by a 




judgment would be logically compatible with the existence of an intimate relationship.  So even 
if individually valuing each component of an intimate relationship was equivalent to valuing the 
relationship as a whole, there is still a difference between the kind of values addressed by the 
necessary conditions discussed previously and the sufficient condition under present discussion. 
Aristotle’s and Held’s successes in accounting for the value of intimate relationships, along with 
Kant’s and Moore’s failures, would also support an induction to the conclusion that this 
sufficient condition is also a necessary condition.  Kant’s and Moore’s theories fail to meet the 
necessary conditions discussed in the previous section but they also fail to meet the sufficient 
condition.  Kantianism’s inability to assign moral value to love or any action it motivates 
prevents Kantianism from assigning value to intimate relationships themselves.  Moore’s version 
of consequentialism is no better at treating intimate relationships as final goods or necessary to 
the final good than it is at treating the people in an intimate relationship as final goods or 
necessary to the final good.  Thus, the two theories that fail to appreciate the moral value of 
intimate relationships cannot assign final value or value necessary to final value to intimate 
relationships.  On the other hand, the two theories that successfully account for the value of 
intimate relationships both recognize those relationships as having more than instrumental 
goodness.  Despite this evidence, it may still be logically, if not actually possible, for a normative 
theory to meet the necessary conditions described in the last section, assign intimate relationships 
only instrumental value, and still capture the value of intimate relationships. This logical 
possibility makes it equally difficult to answer whether the necessary conditions described in the 
previous section are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to recognize the value of 




If appraising the value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental is a necessary 
condition of a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships 
then the necessary conditions are not jointly sufficient.  Conversely, if appraising the 
value of intimate relationships as more than instrumental  is not a necessary condition of 
a normative theory’s ability to capture the value of intimate relationships then the 
necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for a normative theory’s ability to capture the 
value of intimate relationships.  
Part III: Other Conclusions 
 Through the examination of the four normative theories’ abilities to capture the value of 
intimate relationships several other important points about these abilities have been revealed: it is 
unnecessary for a normative theory to assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships, it is 
unnecessary to limit the sphere of valuable relationships to friendships, it is helpful for a 
normative theory to understand humans as necessarily social or co-dependent beings, it is helpful 
for a normative theory to be particularistic as opposed to universalistic. 
 The point made in chapter three, that assigning intrinsic value to intimate relationships is 
unnecessary to a normative theory’s ability to capture the moral value of intimate relationships, 
was verified by the examination of the four normative theories.  Moore’s consequentialism as 
well as Held’s ethics of care both assigned intrinsic value to intimate relationships, yet Moore’s 
theory still ultimately fails to appreciate the value of these relationships.  Conversely, while 
neither Aristotle’s nor Kant’s theories understand intimate relationships as being intrinsically 
valuable only Aristotle’s is able to account for the moral value of those relationships.  The 
preceding discussion proves that it is neither necessary nor an impediment to a theory’s ability to 




This is important because normative theories have been criticized because of the inability to 
assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships.
211
 
 The discussion of the previous chapters also shows that restricting the set of morally 
valuable relationships to friendships does not help a theory capture the moral value of 
relationships.  Kant most explicitly limits the set of morally valuable relationships to friendships 
by emphasizing the need for equality between friends as a result of the tenuous nature of 
friendship’s balance of respect and mutual love.
212
  This description is in line with Neera 
Badhwar’s and Laurence Thomas’ descriptions of friendship which each contain a criterion of 
equality between those in the relationship.
213
  Yet, Kant’s focus on equality does not allow his 
theory to acknowledge the moral value of such relationships.  In fact, Aristotle and Held, who 
are both willing to value relationships between unequals, are the theorists who propose 
normative theories that successfully capture the moral value of some interpersonal relationships.  
One cannot conclude from this that friendships are no more valuable than other forms of intimate 
relationships.  One can, however, conclude that the criterion of equality, when added to the other 
criteria of intimate relationships more generally, does not specially entail moral value of 
relationships that would otherwise not contain any moral value. 
 A noteworthy similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s account of intimate relationships’ 
values is the place they give relationships in human life.  Both see interpersonal relationships as 
an absolutely necessary piece of any human life.  For Aristotle, what it means to be human and 
what it means to lead a good human life are interconnected.  Thus, after explaining that “…man 
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is born for citizenship” it comes as no surprise that his account of moral life includes intimate 
relationships as a necessary component.
214
  Books IIX and IX of Nicomachean Ethics are 
necessary to a full explanation of a good human life because part of what it means to be human 
according to Aristotle is to be enmeshed in social relationships.  Held recognizes the centrality of 
interpersonal relationships to human life as well.  In arguing for the necessity of care to human 
life she points out the fact that humans cannot survive without others.
215
  Human infants are 
biologically incapable of caring for themselves.  Thus, everyone who survives past infancy must 
have some interpersonal relationships.  Furthermore, anyone who survives to an age at which one 
can live a solitary life can only do so as a result of one’s past interpersonal relationships that 
nurtured the capability to live alone.  Held’s acknowledgement of these points transitions 
smoothly into an argument for her conclusions about the moral value of intimate relationships.  
On the other hand, Kant’s and Moore’s normative theories are, in a sense, disconnected from 
their views about interpersonal relationships.  Kant’s view of morality is grounded in a human’s 
ability to rationally recognize one’s moral duties, and one requires no other person to exercise it.  
For Moore, though intimate relationships are intrinsically valuable, they are not necessary to the 
final good at which every moral human must aim.  By setting up interpersonal relationships as a 
necessary part of human life, both Aristotle and Held make it easier to incorporate the moral 
value of intimate relationships into their normative theories.  Assigning moral value to intimate 
relationships is a logical step for a normative theory that acknowledges the necessity of 
interpersonal relationships to human life as part of its foundation.  A theory such as Kant’s or 
Moore’s that is not grounded in similar views about what it means to be human will need to 
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make a more circuitous, less obvious, argument for including intimate relationships among the 
set of morally valuable objects.  This is not to say it is impossible for a theory with a different 
foundation to acknowledge the moral value of intimate relationships, but it would likely be more 
difficult. 
 Another revealing similarity between Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories is their 
focus on the value of particular objects.  Neither theory acknowledges universal rules of morality 
that must be followed or universal standards to justify moral value, but both are able to explain 
the moral value of intimate relationships.  Kant’s and Moore’s theories, on the other hand, do 
appeal to universal standards of right and wrong and have trouble accounting for the moral value 
of intimate relationships.  These connections may be more than mere correlation.  The problem 
with appeals to universal moral standards is that they make it difficult to admit of the value in 
particular objects.  This issue was described in the introduction in relation to the Christian 
concept of agape: when love is universal it also fails to distinguish between individuals.  
However, the love that exists between those people in intimate relationships must distinguish 
between the other in the relationship and others with whom one is not in a relationship.  In fact, 
part of what it means to treat the other in an intimate relationship as an end in himself is to 
recognize her as an individual.
216
  This is partially responsible for Kantianism’s problem 
recognizing the moral value of intimate relationships: even when one treats another as an end in 
himself, for the action to have moral worth it must be motivated by abstract reason and an appeal 
to a universal standard of goodness as opposed to love, which focuses on the particulars of 
another person.
217
  Moore’s version of consequentialism is prevented from acknowledging the 
value of intimate relationships by its appeal to the universal rule that the morally right action is 
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one that maximizes the good.  Due to the theory’s appeal to a universal rule all particular goods 
are made instrumental to the realization of the final good: that state of affairs in which the good 
has been maximized.  Therefore, no particular other person or intimate relationship can be a final 
good.
218
  Aristotle’s and Held’s normative theories do not need to resolve such conflicts between 
universal rules or justifications and particular intimate relationships.  As a result, they have fewer 
obstacles to impede their valuation of intimate relationships.  This does not prove that it is 
impossible for a normative theory that appeals to a universal rule or standard to recognize the 
moral value of intimate relationships, but it does give one reason to think that normative theories 
that lack such appeals have an easier time recognizing intimate relationships’ values. 
 Intimate relationships are deeply valuable to those people involved in them and this value 
is not merely subjective.  There is moral value in intimate relationships: those relationships in 
which the members love one another, wish one another well, act for one another, do so mutually, 
and trust that each loves and wishes the other well as an end in himself.  In order for a normative 
theory to account for this value it must necessarily not explicitly or implicitly exclude the moral 
value of all instances of wishing one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that 
treats the other as an end in himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another.  Furthermore, 
any normative theory that values intimate relationships as more than instrumentally good can 
account for the moral value of those relationships.  It is unnecessary for normative theories to 
assign intrinsic value to intimate relationships or to narrow the range of valuable relationships to 
friendships in order to assign moral value to interpersonal relationships.  It is easier, though, for a 
normative theory that recognizes the necessity of interpersonal relationships to human life and 
the value in particular objects and people to account for the moral value of normative 
relationships.  Theories like Kant’s and Moore’s fail to meet the necessary conditions that in 
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order to account for the value of intimate relationships a normative theory must not explicitly or 
implicitly exclude the moral value of all instances to some instances of loving another, wishing 
one another well, acting for one another, doing so in a way that treats the other as an end in 
himself, doing so mutually, and trusting one another.  Therefore, they lack the ability to describe 
the moral value of romantic couples, close friendships, parent-child relationships, and other 
intimate relationships that are part of everyone’s life from time to time.  They act as filters that 
fail to capture some of the moral landscape’s most interesting colors.  Theories like Aristotle’s 
and Held’s, on the other hand, that meet the necessary conditions described above and the 
sufficient condition of assigning more than instrumental value to intimate relationships more 
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